Meaning Relations, Possible Objects, and Possible Worlds
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Our aims are threefold. First we shall present our philosophical approach to meaning and modality, and outline the formal semantics which it provides for modal logics (Sections I and II). Secondly, we shall show that for certain philosophical reasoning concerning truths ex vi terminorum, the logic of possible objects provides an explication where the logic of modal operators does not (Section III). Finally, we shall explore the extension of our theory to names and definite descriptions (Section IV).
KeywordsModal Logic Singular Term Modal Qualifier Virtual Object Definite Description
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