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Meaning Relations, Possible Objects, and Possible Worlds

  • Karel Lambert
  • Bas C. Van Fraassen
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 29)

Abstract

Our aims are threefold. First we shall present our philosophical approach to meaning and modality, and outline the formal semantics which it provides for modal logics (Sections I and II). Secondly, we shall show that for certain philosophical reasoning concerning truths ex vi terminorum, the logic of possible objects provides an explication where the logic of modal operators does not (Section III). Finally, we shall explore the extension of our theory to names and definite descriptions (Section IV).

Keywords

Modal Logic Singular Term Modal Qualifier Virtual Object Definite Description 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

  1. C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford, Symbolic Logic, (Dover ed.) New York 1959, pp.66–70.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    H. S. Leonard ‘Essences, Attributes and Predicates’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 37 (1964) 25–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. So the conceptions of Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation and Wittgenstein’sTractatus relate to the former; Sellars’ ‘extra-conceptual’ possibilities to the latter.Google Scholar
  4. See MRM. At the Irvine Colloquium we followed the exposition of MRM, and Dana Scott pointed out the elegance gained by not trying to represent natural modality at the same time. However, in the course of a philosophical retrenchment such as is attempted in MRM, due attention should be given to the peculiarities of natural modality.Google Scholar
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    Cf. R. Meyer and K. Lambert ‘Universally Free Logic and Standard Quantification Theory’ The Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (1968) 8–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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    Cf. the discussion in R. H. Thomason, ‘Modal Logic and Metaphysics’ in The Logical Way of Doing Things (ed. by K. Lambert), New Haven (1969).Google Scholar
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  8. This was suggested by Professor T. Drange, West Virginia University, to Profs. R. Meyer, Bryn Mawr College, and K. Lambert, who subsequently constructed the counterexample which follows.Google Scholar
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  10. See reference 7. This discussion concerns the kind of statements which provides the central examples in the debate about essentialism.Google Scholar
  11. For explicit consideration of such stronger description theories, see our ‘On Free Description Theory’, Zeitschrift für math. Logik und Grundl. der Math. 13 (1967) 225–240.Google Scholar
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  13. Note that x = n may be true when n is a name, in which case n is the name of a subsistent; if E!x&x = n is true, n names an existent, and if □ x = n is true then n is the name of a substance.Google Scholar
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    See especially J. M. Dunn and N. D. Belnap, Jr. ‘The Substitution Interpretation of the Quantifiers’, Nous 2 (1968) 177–185, and H. Leblanc ‘A simplified account of validity and implication for quantificational logic’, Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (1968) 231–235.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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  16. 16.
    See Thomason, op. cit and ‘Some Completeness Results for Modal Predicate Calculi’ in the present volume, pp. 56–76. In this appendix we follow the more general exposition of MRM.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1970

Authors and Affiliations

  • Karel Lambert
    • 1
    • 2
  • Bas C. Van Fraassen
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.University of CaliforniaIrvineUSA
  2. 2.Yale University and Indiana UniversityUSA

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