Abstract
What are the positive contributions of both Grünbaum and Duhem? This is not a contradiction since Grünbaum has on several significant occasions in the last few years stressed that Duhem has two things to say: one of them is both historically correct and a great insight, namely what Grünbaum referred to a couple of years ago as the weaker thesis of Duhem; the other put forth in somewhat unclear fashion by Duhem himself is the so-called stronger thesis of the impossibility of refuting any particular H, and it is this thesis which is incorrect.
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© 1963 D. Reidel Publishing Company Dordrecht-Holland
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Cohen, R.S. (1963). Comments. In: Wartofsky, M.W. (eds) Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science 1961/1962. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3263-6_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3263-6_15
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