Phenomenology and Ontology

Abstract

(a) Puzzles: “ Zurück zu den Sachen”, “ Back to the facts” was Husserl’s epoch-making slogan. Though I have long since been captivated by this slogan, I have never ceased to be puzzled by it. Husserl’s programme attracted me because of his rejection of speculative metaphysics. Philosophy, it seems to me, must in some sense be descriptive. But what should it describe? What sorts of facts are those that philosophy should describe ? How are these facts different from the facts described by ordinary perceptual statements as also by the descriptive statements of the sciences? Further, is pure description at all possible? Pure description, it would seem, would be possible only if it were also possible for something to be given without the least admixture of interpretation. But is not all that seems to be given shot through with interpretations ? More particularly, is not all given- ness subject to the mould imposed by language? Is there, positively asking, any mode of direct i.e. non-linguistic access to the facts concerned? Finally, how is the ancient and age-old conception of philosophy as explanatory and interpretative in function to be accommodated? In other words, should philosophy abandon its age-old function which, as it were, has come to constitute its defining character and assume a totally new role, and if so would not the new science forfeit its claim to be called ‘ philosophy’?