Remarks on the Content Theory

Abstract

In this paper I wish to clarify certain points which I consider to be muddles in connection with the content theory. By ‘content theory’ I mean the philosophical contention that knowledge involves three factors: a subject, an object and a content. Amongst those who subscribe to such an analysis of knowledge there is a great deal of divergence of opinion regarding the more specific problems about the nature of each of the three factors and the exact relation between any two of them. I do not wish to take up these issues in this paper. I only wish to draw attention to certain mistakes which, in my opinion, have characterised the entire discussion for and against the content theory. Once these mistakes are set aside, it would be possible — so it seems to me — to rehabilitate the content theory on a sounder basis than before.

Published in the Visva Bharati Journal of Philosophy, Vol. I, No. 2, 1965, pp. 38–42.