Abstract
In spite of the importance accorded by certain philosophers to the state of nature and the original contract, the doctrine of natural law is not basically dependent on either of these concepts. Grotius and Burlamaqui managed to found their theories without much reference to the state of nature, and Burlamaqui was not interested in the original contract either. Neither hypothesis features prominently in the work of Cicero or of Aristotle, and yet it cannot be said that they disbelieved in natural law.
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Notes
Cf. Barckhausen, Montesquieu, ses idées et ses œuvres, p. 95.
M., p. 287. On the influence of Locke, see also Dedieu, Montesquieu et la tradition politique anglaise, pp. 160–91. Bolingbroke’s Dissertation on Parties is another possible source of M.’s theory (cf. Shackleton, M., pp. 296-301 and ‘Montesquieu, Bolingbroke, and the Separation of Powers’, French Studies, 1949, pp. 25-38).
Cf. the passage devoted to ‘La liberté politique, dans un citoyen’, in Book XI, vi, N. I, i, p. 208, Pl. II, p. 397).
Cf. Pufendorf, Dv., II, xii, 6-7, pp. 336-7; Domat, op. cit., Traité des lois, xi, 6, vol. I, p. xv.
Cf. the phrase “La politique est une lime sourde, qui use et qui parvient lentement à sa fin” (Lois, XIV, xiii, N. I, i, p. 321, Pl. II, p. 487).
Utopia [1515-16], translated by R. Robynson, edited by J. R. Lumby, Cambridge University Press, 1897, PP-126–7 (original spelling).
In an early Pensée, M. condemned revenge, on the grounds that it is ineffective in procuring its “but naturel” or “vrai but”, namely the ending of vicious intentions in the offender (P. 29, Bkn. 1102, N. II, p. 8, Pl. I, p. 1286). Grotius had similarly condemned revenge (Dg., II, xx, 5, vol. II, p. 572).
Cf. Grotius, Dg., II, xx, 20 and 34, vol. II, pp. 596 and 608-9.
Cf. R. Anchel, Crimes et châtiments au XVIIIe siècle, Perrin, 1933, p. 4.
Pufendorf, Dn., VIII, iii, 9, vol. II, p. 384; Grotius, Dg., II, xx, 7, vol. II, p. 574; Hobbes, The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance, p. 177; Domat, on the other hand, here out of tune with the trend of natural law at his time, also emphasized the need to revenge society, op. cit., Le Droit public, III, vol. II, p. 192.
See above, Chapter 3, I.
Les Caractères [1688-94], XIV, 51, in Œuvres de La Bruyère, Hachette, 1922, vol. III, i, p. 188.
Politique d’Aristote, pp. cii–ciii; cf. Destutt de Tracy, Commentaire sur l’Esprit des lois, p. 77.
The three places are: Lois, XII, xiv, N. I, i, pp. 267–8, Pl. II, pp. 444-5 (on la pudeur, already discussed); Lois, VI, xvii, N. I, i, pp. 123-4, Pl. II, P. 329 (on torture); Lois, XV, viii, N. I, i, pp. 333-4, Pl. II, pp. 496-7 (on slavery, see below, pp. 160-1).
Histoire de la science politique, vol. II, p. 380.
Some of those who condemned torture are listed in Dn., VIII, iii, 4, n. 10, vol. II, pp. 376-7. L. M. Levin says that writers in Antiquity had not condemned torture (The Political Doctrine of Montesquieu’s Esprit des lois, New York, Institute of French Studies, [1936], pp. 229-30); however, the Digest had advised the greatest caution in its use (XLVIII, xviii, pp. 811-13).
Cf. A. Chéruel, Dictionnaire historique des institutions, mœurs et coutumes de la France, Hachette, 1874, vol. II, pp. 1219–20; also R. Anchel, op. cit., p. 139.
Cf. Utopia, pp. 28 and 37-9; Dg., II, i, 14, vol. I, pp. 219-20.
Cf. Grotius, Dg., II, xx, 35, vol. II, p. 610.
Montesquieu, pp. 221–2.
Cf. Deuteronomy, XXV, 2; Digest, XLVIII, xix, u, p. 815; S.t., II, ii, Q. 99, A. 4, vol. XI, p. 248.
Op. cit., Le Droit public, III, vol. II, p. 194; cf. ibid., tit. 1, pp. 196-200.
Cf. Chéruel, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 963-5 and 1122-3; also Anchel, op. cit., passim, and Brethe de la Gressaye, Lois, vol. II, pp. 372-3, n. 10, to p. 112.
Deuteronomy, XVII, 6; S.t., II, ii, Q. 70, A. 2, vol. X, pp. 267-8; Dn., V, xiii, 9, vol. II, p. 147.
Cf. Dg., II, xx, 18, vol. II, pp. 593-4; Dn., VIII, iii, 14, vol. II, p. 388.
See N. III, pp. 469-70.
See N. III, p. 470 and p. 476, n. a.
Cf. Faguet, La Politique comparée de Montesquieu, Rousseau et Voltaire, p. 174.
Cf. Lois, XXV, xi, N. I, ii, pp. 124–5, Pl. II, pp. 749-50; also the satirical letter from “Le roi du Thibet”, denouncing the activities of Christian missionaries, perhaps intended for the Lois: Brethe de 1a Gressaye, Lois, vol. III, pp. 440-1, n. 43.
La Roche, Examen critique, pp. 135–6 and Réponse à la Défense, pp. 226-9; 1750: 7th Proposition, and 1752: 2nd Proposition: see Beyer, ‘Montesquieu et la censure religieuse’, p. 115, n. 1.
N. I, ii, p. 118, n. a, Pl. II, p. 744, n. a; cf. Brethe de la Gressaye, Lois, vol. III, p. 437, n. 34, to p. 277, and Pl. II, p. 1526.
Cf. Bérard, ‘L’ Esprit des lois devant la Congrégation de l’Index’, pp. 623–4.
Cf. Vernière, Spinoza et la pensée française, vol. II, p. 457; Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus, xx, pp. 952-64.
Commentaire philosophique sur ces paroles de Jésus-Christ, Contrains-les d’entrer, [1686-7], in Œuvres diverses, vol. II, pp. 355–560.
Letters Concerning Toleration [1689-1706], in Works, Strahan, etc., 1777, vol. II, pp. 313–681.
Montesquieu, p. 292.
On the development of this attitude, see Shelby T. McCloy, The Humanitarian Movement in Eighteenth-Century France, University of Kentucky Press, 1957, pp. 172–209.
Hachette, 1911.
Montesquieu, pp. 200–10.
The following examples show the uncertainty of Dedieu’s conjectmes: in L.p. LXXV, N. I, iii, pp. 155-6, Pl. I, p. 245, Usbek showed that the Christians started by freeing their slaves, because all men are equal, but ended by enslaving the negroes in order to cultivate land in the colonies. It is difficult to say how far this ironical criticism is sentimental or rational. In L.p. XXXIV, N. I, iii, p. 71, Pl. I, p. 180, Usbek showed that slaves have a bad effect on their masters: this argument is utilitarian, not sentimental. Dedieu conjectured that P. 174 (Bkn. 1935) and P. 2194 (Bkn. 171) were written after 1733 (Montesquieu, p. 204). In fact, though he was right about P. 2194 (after 1749), he was wrong about P. 174, which was probably written as early as 1721-31. Thus it is not correct to say that between 1721-33, M. “obéit […] plus au sentiment qu’à la raison” (Montesquieu, p. 202). Dedieu did not of course have any positive means of dating the Pensées.
See above, p. 61, n. 38.
See P. van Tieghem, Le Préromantisme, SFELT, 1948, vol. I, pp. 10–11 and 165-6, for a discussion of the influence of this idea.
Cf. Ehrard, L’idée de nature, vol. II, pp. 509–15.
Le Spinozisme de Montesquieu, pp. 58–61.
Cf. Coplestone, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 94-5.
Politics, I, ii, 14–15, pp. 23-5; cf. ibid., 19-20, pp. 27-9.
Montesquieu e la scienza délia società, p. 370.
Cf. Aristotle, Politics, I, ii, 20-21, p. 29; Digest, I, vi, 1, p. 8; Pufendorf, Dn., VI, iii, 7-8, vol. II, pp. 204-6; see also Levin, op. cit., pp. 262-4.
See Jameson, op. cit., pp. 59-66.
Exodus, XXI, 20-21. Barbeyrac discussed this law (Dn., VI, iii, 4, n. 3, vol. II, p. 203) in the sort of impartial tone that the positivists pretend to find in M., whereas M.’s criticism was expressed in emotive terms.
Locke was probably refuting Hobbes, eg. Leviathan, II, xviii, pp. 159-70: he was principally concerned with the political implications of the theory.
Op. cit., p. 202, n. 1.
Following the order of P. 174; in Lois, XV, ii, this argument comes first.
Politics, I, ii, 16-18, pp. 25–7.
Jameson, op. cit., p. 9.
Eg. Institutes, I, iii, 2-3, p. 2.
St. Thomas, S.t., II, ii, Q.57, A. 3, rep. obj. 2, vol. X, p. no; Domat, op. cit., Livre préliminaire, ii, 2, paragraph 3, vol. I, p. 14. See Jameson, op. cit., pp. 82-212 for a full account of this question.
République, I, v, pp. 32–47.
The jurists did not say that it was necessarily in order to prevent an enemy from killing a soldier at the moment of capture, that the former was enslaved, but rather in order to prevent him from returning home and then renewing the war. M. does not, in this passage, say how it is possible to “s’assurer de [la] personne [des captifs], qu’ils ne puissent plus nuire”, without enslaving them permanently.
Op. cit., loc. cit.
Politics, I, ii, 20-21, p. 29.
See Brethe de la Gressaye, Lois, vol. II, p. 418, n. 45, to p. 224; Pl. II, p. 1510.
Cf. Dedieu, Montesquieu, pp. 204–5 and 207.
Jameson, op. cit., pp. 318-9; cf. Dedieu, Montesquieu, p. 207; Dodds, op. cit., pp. 120-3; Levin, op. cit., p. 251; Brethe de la Gressaye, Lois, vol. II, p. 212; Crocker, Nature and Culture, p. 321.
Loc. cit.
Cf. Lois, XVII, ii, N. I, ii, pp. 368–9, Pl. II, pp. 523-4: hot climates turn people into political slaves; also Lois, V, xv, N. I, i, p. 85, Pl. II, p. 297.
Brethe de la Gressaye, Lois, vol. II, p. 417, n. 42, to p. 224.
See the Histoire naturelle de l’homme of 1749, in Œuvres philosophiques, pp. 312–3, where Buffon, deploring the maltreatment of the negroes, clearly reveals his personal emotions.
Cf. Fletcher, Montesquieu and English Politics, p. 228: “Never do we see his powers of reason and feeling more closely mated”.
Starobinski, op. cit., p. 109; Shelby T. McCloy, op. cit., p. 86.
Montesquieu, pp. 186–7; Montesquieu l’homme et l’oeuvre, pp. 132-3.
Montesquieu, p. 210; Montesquieu l’homme et l’oeuvre, p. 163.
Le Spinozisme de Montesquieu, p. 80; cf. a similar statement in Fletcher, Montesquieu and English Politics, p. 194.
A notable exception to this tendency was the eighteenth-century philoshopher Morelly: cf. his Code de la nature [1755], edited by G. Chinard, 1950, pp. 206–7; on Morelly, see R. N. C. Coe, ‘A 1a recherche de Morelly’, RHLF, 1957, pp. 321-34 and 515-23.
Vian, op. cit., p. 316; Barckhausen, Montesquieu, ses idées et ses œuvres, p. 42; Gharmont, op. cit., p. 40.
Sée, Les Idées politiques, p. 137.
Eg. Vian, op. cit., pp. 337-8; Sorel, op. cit., p. 164; Sabine, op. cit., p. 551. This view has been convincingly challenged by A. Laborde-Milaâ, ‘La Sensibilité de Montesquieu’, Revue des études historiques, 1908, pp. 333-40. It is time somebody pointed out that M.’s refusal to reveal his identity to the batelier whose father’s ransom he paid, indicates not so much “un caractère de bonté dédaigneuse” (Vian, loc. cit.), as modesty or timidity — M. admitted that timidity had been “le fléau de toute ma vie” (P. 1005, Bkn. 7, N. II, p. 278, Pl. I, p. 980).
Cf. Shackleton, M., p. 203.
Edgar Zévort is surely mistaken when he claims that M. “restera […] jusqu’à la fin, le partisan du communisme” (Montesquieu, Lecène et Oudin, 1888, p. 109).
Cf. Sorel, op. cit., p. 128; Ehrard, Politique de Montesquieu, p. 241.
Op. cit., Le Droit public, I, xviii, vol. II, pp. 131-2.
See below, p. 174.
Cf. PJato, Laws, I, 626a, vol. I, p. 7, where one speaker says that each Greek state is “by a law of nature, engaged perpetually in an informal war with every other state”. See also Levin, op. cit., pp. 48-9.
Continuation des pensées diverses, cxxiv-cxxv, pp. 359–62.
Cf. S.t., II, ii, Q. 25, A. 9, vol. IX, p. 324: “charity does not require us to do that which belongs to its perfection. Therefore charity does not require us to show the signs and effects of love to our enemies”.
Ibid., Q.40. A. 1, vol. IX, pp. 500-503.
Cf. Grotius, Dg., I, ii, 6-10, vol. I, pp. 76–106.
Cf. Levin, op. cit., pp. 135-7.
Commentaire sur quelques principales maximes de l’Esprit des lois, Œuvres complètes, vol. XXX, p. 412; Dictionnaire philosophique, art. ‘Guerre’, Œuvres complètes, vol. XIX, pp. 321-2. The latest study of the attitude of M. to Machiavelli is by Shackleton, Comparative Literature Studies, 1964, pp. 1-13.
Cf. Grotius, Dg., II, i, 17, vol. I, p. 221; Pufendorf, Dn., VII, vi, 5, vol. II, p. 458; Burlamaqui, Principes du droit politique, Amsterdam, 1751, IV, ii, 11, vol. II, pp. 18-19.
Cf. Ehrard, Politique de Montesquieu, p. 308.
Lettres persanes, éd. Vernière, p. 375, n. c, and Pl. I, p. 1593.
Barckhausen, Montesquieu, ses idées et ses œuvres, p. 202.
Even though it must be admitted that he did not show that the “Germains” attacked the Roman Empire in self-defence.
P. 1814, Bkn. 390, N. II, p. 538, Pl. II, p. 1100; Pufendorf, Dn., VIII, vi, 2, vol. II, p. 455; Gravina, Origines iuris civilis, II, xiv, p. 253; cf. Levin, op. cit., pp. 138-9.
Grotius, Dg., III, xx, 27-40, vol. II, pp. 953–9; Pufendorf, Dn., VIII, vii, 2, vol. II, p. 475, and ibid., viii, 1-4, pp. 480-2.
Cf. Lettres persanes, ed. Vernière, p. 375, n. c, to p. 197, and Pl. I, p. 1593.
Several points of detail also show this influence. In P. 1814, Bkn. 390, N. II, p. 538, Pl. II, p. 1100, M. stated that it is wrong to poison the waters of an enemy country or to assassinate its monarch. These two points had been discussed by Grotius, who implied that it is wrong to poison waters, but that it is not wrong for a king to be assassinated by a man who is not his subject (Dg., III, iv, 16-18, vol. II, pp. 778-83); Pufendorf also thought that such assassination is not wrong (Dn., VIII, vi, 16, vol. II, p. 469). In the Lois, M. showed that the rights of ambassadors are governed by the law of nations and not by political law (XXVI, xxi, N. I, ii, pp. 154-5, Pl. II, p. 773); Grotius (Dg., II, xviii, vol. II, pp. 531-47) and Pufendorf (Dn., II, iii, 23, vol. I, p. 215) had spoken in similar terms. In the L.p., Usbek said that “une alliance, faite entre deux nations pour en opprimer une troisième, n’est pas légitime” (XCV, N. I, iii, p. 190, Pl. I, p. 272); Grotius (Dg., II, xxv, 4, vol. II, pp. 695-6) and Pufendorf (Dn., VIII, vi, 14, vol. II, p. 467) again held similar views.
Dictionnaire philosophique, art. ‘Patrie’, Œuvres complètes, vol. XX, p. 185.
Politique tirée de l’écriture sainte, I, i, 3-4, pp. 313–4.
Œuvres, vol. II, p. 567; see Shackleton, M., p. 71, n, 3. for a further parallel between M. and Fénelon.
Cf. Lp. XLVI, N. I, iii, pp. 88-9, Pl. I, pp. 194-5.
Cf. also Samuel Clarke’s “agreeing community of all mankind”, Discourse, p. 622.
The Communings with Himself of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, VI, xlvi, Loeb edition, PP. 155–7.
For example: Comte, Cours de philosophie positive, vol. IV, p. 128; Vaughan, Studies in the History of Political Philosophy, vol. I, p. 290; R. Hubert, ‘La Notion du devenir historique dans la philosophie de Montesquieu’, Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 1939, p. 609; G. Chinard, ‘Montesquieu’s Historical Pessimism’, pp. 163-4; Vyverberg, op. cit., pp. 161-9; Crocker, Nature and Culture, p. 510; P. Gay, The Party of Humanity, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964, p. 271.
Loc. cit.
Cf. P. 478, Bkn. 2171,N. II, p. 171, Pl. I,pp. 1564-5; P. 551, Bkn. 2172, N. II, p. 187, Pl. I, p. 1565; P. 1993, Bkn. 658, N. II, p. 611, Pl. I, p. 1161 ;Lois, XXIV,ii, N. I, ii, pp. 81-2, Pl. II, pp. 715-6.
Cf. Vyverberg, op. cit., pp. 66-70.
Ibid., pp. 175-88.
Ibid., p. 155.
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Waddicor, M.H. (1970). Rationalism in Positive Law: Montesquieu the Reformer. In: Montesquieu and the Philosophy of Natural Law. Archives Internationales D’Histoire des Idées / International Archives of the History of Ideas, vol 37. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3238-4_6
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