Abstract
People with little sympathy for the work of philosophers have claimed that the capital invested in philosophy is itself not philosophical, and that philosophical doctrines are born from unphilosophical prejudices. Philosophers as a group reject this accusation and proudly point to the exceptional achievements of some individual minds entirely independent from their historical environment or their educational background. As a rule, however, one is inclined to agree that in most cases the starting positions of a thinking man are rather received than created, more an implement of thought than thought itself. The sceptic frowns upon human knowledge because it does not satisfy the requirements which he, beforehand and arbitrarily, has decreed to be the minimal ones. The Cartesian rationalist overcomes scepticism because, before any meditation, he has already decided to accept the strongest available evidence as evidence itself. Kant denied the possibility of metaphysics as a science simply because he was convinced that Newtonian physics was the paradigm of all scientific knowledge.
“Tantum scis quantum operaris” From Satellitium animi
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© 1970 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Noreña, C.G. (1970). Range and Purpose of Human Knowledge. In: Juan Luis Vives. Archives Internationales D’Histoire des Idees/International Archives of the History of Ideas, vol 34. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3220-9_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3220-9_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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