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Two Views of the Nature of Knowledge

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Part of the book series: Tulane Studies in Philosophy ((TUSP,volume 18))

Abstract

The nature of knowledge may be regarded in either of two fundamentally different ways, and one’s whole philosophy will rest on the view he assumes, yet few philosophers have been explicit about the assumption they make. Western philosophy has been largely dominated by the Greek view that knowledge is the apprehension of reality. This view was fully formulated by Plato and led to Aristotle’s ideal of perfect knowledge as contemplation.

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References

  1. For an interpretation of Anaxagoras according to this view, see Shannon DuBose, “Anaxagoras’ Theory of Mind,” Tulane Studies in Philosophy, Vol. XIII (1964), p. 50.

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  2. See Knowledge and Perception, (Oxford, 1950), p. 88.

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  3. This contention is elaborated in my paper “A Fitting Theory of Truth,” Tulane Studies in Philosophy, Vol. XIV (1965), 93.

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  4. A. Phillips Griffiths has edited an anthology of this literature: Knowledge and Belief, (Oxford, 1967).

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  5. Or, knowledge is what can be correctly inferred from incorrigible foundations, to use an inept metaphor that has become an Oxonian parochialism. See J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, (Galaxy N. Y.), p. 105.

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  6. See Lovejoy’s essay “The Anomaly of Knowledge” first published in The University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. IV, 1923. Reprinted in The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays, (The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1963) p. 244. Italics Lovejoy’s.

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  7. See The Johns Hopkins reprint, pp. 251, 255 and 256.

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© 1969 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands

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Lee, H.N. (1969). Two Views of the Nature of Knowledge. In: Epistemology II. Tulane Studies in Philosophy, vol 18. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3197-4_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3197-4_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-247-0292-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-3197-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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