Abstract
Fisk begins his discussion by asserting, that the FS model attempts to complete the SR model by accounting for the necessity with which, according to the SR model, a capacity will be exercised when certain operations are performed. He argues that the FS model ultimately fails in this task, and he seeks to improve upon the FS approach by grounding the relevant necessity in an entity’s nature — a component that defenders of the FS model ignore or misinterpret. For the most part my comments will concern the general strategy of his paper rather than details of the arguments he offers.
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Notes
W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object, Cambridge, Mass. 1960, pp. 222–5.
A similar approach to causal conditionals can be found in W. Sellars, ‘Counterfactuals, Dispositionals, and the Causal Modalities’, in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume II (ed. by H. Feigl et al.) Minneapolis 1958, pp. 225–308.
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© 1971 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Aune, B. (1971). Fisk on Capacities and Natures. In: Buck, R.C., Cohen, R.S. (eds) PSA 1970. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3142-4_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3142-4_6
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