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Functionalism and the Negative Feedback Model in Biology

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PSA 1970

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 8))

Abstract

Any study of the philosophical literature dealing with the cluster of topics generally identified as ‘functional description’, ‘functional analysis’, and ‘teleological explanation’ naturally raises the problem of confirming, disconfirming, or at least relating the alternative logical models proposed by philosophers to the actual usage of biologists.1 A close examination of current biological literature reveals that acceptance or rejection of what philosophers or sociologists might call a ‘functionalist’ perspective or approach is not significant for the division of biologists into schools or factions. It is certainly not the case that a functionalist perspective distinguishes the wholistic or organismic faction from the molecular biologists. In fact, molecular biologists shift back and forth from ‘functional’ to simple causal perspectives with considerable indifference. This is particularly true of the literature based upon the so-called operon hypothesis developed by the Nobel laureates Jacob and Monod. According to this hypothesis, some but not all of an organism’s genes are code symbols for specific amino acids; distinct ‘operator’ genes either initiate or inhibit the activity of a specific linear sequence of genes. To establish the distinction of the two types of gene activity requires very careful biochemical and genetic analysis of the straightforward, causal sort associated with those two disciplines.

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Roger C. Buck Robert S. Cohen

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© 1971 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

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Manier, E. (1971). Functionalism and the Negative Feedback Model in Biology. In: Buck, R.C., Cohen, R.S. (eds) PSA 1970. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3142-4_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3142-4_16

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0309-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-3142-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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