Mental Events Yet Again: Retrospect on Some Old Arguments

Summary

Contemporary Psychological Behaviorists argue against the existence of mental events in ways that are but little more refined than those of Watson, Lashley, and others forty years ago. The orthodox case stated by today’s psychologists against the possibility of a science of mental events is inconclusive. This is because their attack is usually based on factual considerations, instead of being, what it ought to be, a conceptual analysis of the idea of a mental event. This article seeks to disclose some weaknesses in the standard pattern of attacks on Introspection. It does this by defending the latter (i.e. Introspection) against such factually-orientated criticisms as those of Watson, Lashley, Hull and Skinner. It then challenges Introspection as it should be attacked; not externally with counterfacts, but internally with demonstrations of what is untenable in the very concept of a science of private events called “mental”.