Abstract
In the following I try to make sense of the controversy about the syntheticity of arithmetical propositions by a new interpretation. In doing so I point out that I am not of the opinion that the problem of the synthetic a priori is a dead issue as C. I. Lewis declared in 1946 and others before him and after him. I am also of the opinion that a problem which has been thought over for so long, so intensively and by such outstanding people, can not be solved by a simple yes or no decision. There must be something in the problem which justifies both answers.
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References
L. W. Beck, Studies in the Philosophy of Kant, pp. 74ff.
H. J. Paton, Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience II, p. 130.
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© 1972 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland
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Knauss, G. (1972). Extensional and Intensional Interpretation of Synthetic Propositions A Priori. In: White Beck, L. (eds) Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress. Synthese Historical Library, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3099-1_32
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3099-1_32
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