Abstract
At first sight it appears that Kant might be contradicting himself by asserting, in the course of his theoretically critical philosophy, that truth is the agreement of being and thought; for he dismissed that definition, in the introduction to transcendental logic, as peripheral and insufficient. It is our intention to examine whether in fact Kant contradicts himself, and at the same time to point up the place occupied by the problem of truth in Kant’s transcendental philosophy as we encounter it in the Critique of Pure Reason.
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References
Karl Ulmer, ‘Erörterung des Begriffs Wahrheit’, Philosophisches Jahrbuch 73 (1966) 226–40, at p. 237.
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© 1972 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland
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Hofmeister, H.E.M. (1972). The Problem of Truth in the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. In: White Beck, L. (eds) Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress. Synthese Historical Library, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3099-1_27
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3099-1_27
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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