Abstract
The philosophic insight of this for the transcendental deduction rather important point is obscured by the psychological, or semi-psychological, language in which it is expressed. The word ‘representation’ (Vorstellung) belongs to the psychologist’s vocabulary rather than to the philosopher’s. And how are we, in this context, to understand the crucial expression ‘I think’? The fact that, in Kant’s words, it must be possible to accompany all my representations implies that it is a psychological occurrence.
In B 132 Kant says:
It must be possible for the T think’ to accompany all my presentations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to say that the representation would be impossible, or at least it would be nothing to me.
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© 1972 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland
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Hartnack, J. (1972). B 132 Revisited. In: White Beck, L. (eds) Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress. Synthese Historical Library, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3099-1_24
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3099-1_24
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