Abstract
In this chapter one proposal — the simplest — for using a set-theoretic predicate to make an empirical claim is considered. Some attention is given to questions which arise in connection with this proposal, and proposals subsequently considered, as well. In this connection, the theory of measurement and the question of the “approximate” nature of claims in mathematical physics are discussed briefly. The proposal considered here is shown to be essentially equivalent to the view of how the theory’s statements are obtained from the set-theoretic predicate that was described in Chapter I. Considerable effort is devoted to characterizing a theory relative notion of theoretical term, independently of sweeping epistemological assumptions. This notion is then employed to describe a difficulty that could be encountered in attempting to employ the sentence form proposed here in logical reconstruction. Finally, an attempt is made to relate this difficulty to more traditional discussions of the problem of theoretical terms.
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© 1971 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Sneed, J.D. (1971). The Traditional View. In: The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3066-3_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3066-3_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-3068-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-3066-3
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