Abstract
In this chapter we shall consider Popper’s latest attack on Carnap’s system. This attack represents the fourth main issue of the dispute between Popper and Carnap. Though Popper writes, “I wish to make it clear that my present criticism,… though it may incidentally hit Carnap’s theory of induction, it is not intended to be read as a criticism of this theory. For I have criticised the probabilistic theory of induction … in a far more general way in my Logic of Scientific Discovery, especially on pp. 390f.”1
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Notes
K.R. Popper, “On Carnap’s version of Laplace’s Rule of Succession,” Mind, LXXI (1962) 69.
Y. Bar-Hillel, “On An Alleged Contradiction in Carnap’s Theory of Inductive Logic,” Mind, LXXIII (1964), 265–267.
Richard C. Jeffrey, “Popper on the Rule of Succession,” Mind, LXXIII (1964) 129.
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© 1971 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Michalos, A.C. (1971). The Singular Predictive Inference. In: The Popper-Carnap Controversy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3048-9_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3048-9_6
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