Abstract
In so far as philosophy is a project of man’s freedom it is worked out against a horizon that is intimately connected with the philosopher himself. His project can be said to open up the horizon to be studied. His very definition of philosophy determines the itinerary to be followed. The autenticity of his journey will depend on his description of the point of departure, on how faithful he remains to the real.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
“In a philosophy of Value, this problem (of spiritual conversion) has seemed to us to be related to the problem of a transformation in values, and it is basing ourselves on this relationship that we have tried to explain this movement of spiritual conversion by changes it brings in the value horizons which it distinguishes.” G. Bastide, La conversion spirituelle, p. viii.
Cf. also Les philosophes français d’aujourd’hui, op. cit., p. 245: “Many other philosophers have had recourse to this method of axiology; rarely however has this method been used systematically in relation to the problem of man as we would like to use it.”
Also: “For our part, we have placed the idea of the spiritual conversion at the heart of our work.” G. Bastide, Traité, p. 290.
Cf. G. Bastide, Traité, p. 140; also Méditations, p. 129: “Moreover the reflexive act and freedom are one and the same certitude of consciousness.”
Cf. La condition humaine, op. cit., pp. 285, 319. Cf. also: “L’expérience morale,” in Revue de Synthèse, 1963 (29–31: janvier–septembre), pp. 308, 315, 319 and 320.
Cf. G. Bastide, La condition humaine, p. 369.
“Il y a conscience et j’en témoigne.” G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 1.
Cf. G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 1.
Cf. G. Bastide, “The Metaphysical Dimensions of Man,” op. cit., p. 354.
“We have learned from Descartes that, contrary to the scholastic principle according to which the only authentic movement of thought would be the one which goes from being to knowledge, our reflection ought to be a movement from thought to being. And, on deepening our search for value along this approach we have learned from Kant that a metaphysical axiology ought to replace metaphysical ontology, that is, the reason for being (raison d’être) of being, its ratio essendi cannot be unveiled except by beginning with the different levels of knowing, that is to say, with the ratio cognoscendi. G. Bastide, Traité, p. 127.
G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 106.
Cf. G. Bastide, Traité, I., pp. 385–386.
Cf. G. Bastide, Traité, p. 289.
G. Bastide; “De la situation de l’homme,” op. cit., p. 246.
Cf. note § 6 of this chapter.
Cf. G. Bastide, “Le malin génie,” op. cit., p. 238ss.
Cf. note § 12 of this chapter.
G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 1.
G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 3.
Id., p. 3.
Id., p. 3.
Cf. Méditations, p. 5.
“It is not a question of describing the self complacently in its individualizing characteristics, but rather of discovering oneself as “bearer of the complete sign of the human condition.” G. Bastide, Traité, p. 90.
Cf. G. Bastide, La condition humaine, p. 19.
Id. Cf. also Méditations, p. 5.
“For in the last analysis, it is in the doubt that the cogito is perceived; for the suspension of the judgment in doubt is a willed act as is also the triumphant act of the will affirming my existence as spirit. And the will is freedom; and nothing is more personal than this aspect of my spiritual being.” G. Bastide, La conversion spirituelle, p. 89.
G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 6.
“... the essential character of this knowledge of self is the objectivity of its direction notwithstanding the interiority of its source.” G. Bastide, Traité, p. 89.
Méditations, p. 6.
“Philosophy is the effective exploration ‘with one’s whole existence of the fundamental axiological dimensions of consciousness at work, and we know that is precisely this search which truly constitutes the moral experience of our personal existence in situation.” G. Bastide, Traité, p. 357.
Méditations, op. cit., p. 7.
Méditations, op. cit., p. 14.
Méditations, op. cit., p. 8.
Méditations, op. cit., p. 10.
Méditations, op. cit., p. 10.
“But I see right away between the two a tension wherein is constituted my most personal relationship to myself; at the same time there exists an immense distance with regards to the absolute objectivity of my affirmation.” G. Bastide, Méditations, pp. 11–12.
Méditations, p. 12.
Cf. G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 13.
Traité I., pp, 723–724.
G. Bastide, “Nature, situation et condition humaine,” in Existence et Nature, Paris, P.U.F. 1962, p. 51.
G. Bastide, Traité, I., p. 357.
G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 14.
G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 15.
G. Bastide, Méditations, pp. 15–17.
Cf. G. Bastide, “De la situation de l’homme, op. cit., p. 245.
Cf. G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 45.
“... the problem of Man and that of philosophical activity constitute one and the same problem...” G. Bastide, “De la situation de l’homme,” op. cit., p. 242.
Cf. G. Bastide, “La nature, la conscience et la vie de l’esprit,” op. cit., p. 31.
Méditations, p. 169.
Id.
For Bastide the order of Being refers especially to the ontic order of the reality of nature, of object, of thing in contrast to the order of spirit, freedom, person. (Cf. p. 277 Le moment historique; Traité, p. 759). It is of the order of reality “que je suis (nature),” or “dont je suis,” in contrast to the order of value, the order of “pourquoi,” the order of interiority (Cf. “De la situation... p. 242, op. cit.). In axiology the stable factor is not Being, but the “valeurs finales” of perfection, the imperative of duty immanent to authentic act (cf. p. 760, Traité). The order of Being is the totality of being found in the rationalistic ontologies or the vitalistic historicisms or the philosophies of nothingness and opposed to the order of axiology, the order of freedom, person, knowledge. Cf. Mirages et certitudes, op. cit., pp. 248–249.
Cf. G. Bastide, Traité, p. 357.
Cf. G. Bastide, “The Metaphysical Dimensions of Man,” op. cit., p. 355.
Cf. G. Bastide, Méditations, pp. 143–144.
G. Bastide referring to the philosophy of rationalism as found in the Essays on Theodicy of Leibniz. Cf. Méditations, p. 21.
Cf. Mirages et certitudes pp. 246 ss. Also Traité, p. 148–149.
Cf. Bastide, La condition humaine, p. 4.
Bastide considered the psychological aspects of consciousness especially in the first part of this work. On the level of life (the infrastructure of consciousness) consciousness manifests itself as duration conceived without a beginning or end (Cf. Le Senne, Le devoir, p. 16), having an active past and accomplishing itself in a constant becoming. But even on the vital level consciousness manifests two poles defining the tensional limits of consciousness — “habitude” and spontaneity, aspects brought out by Biran and Bergson. Even on the pre-reflective level there is a certain “primary affective coloration” of a consciousness that is never completely at rest or one with life, always in a state of disadaptation and dynamism. On the other hand, this very disadaptation is a function, therefore orientated in a certain direction. There is a presence with an absence (disequilibrium of consciousness) and a future to be obtained (consciousness as problem). There is neither perfect order nor total chaos. While these principles are not yet of the metaphysical order, says Bastide, they point to it. Cf. especially pp. 23–28.
Cf. G. Bastide, La condition humaine, p. 125.
For Bastide a theory of knowledge in an ontological framework yields only two possibilities — a representational theory of knowledge or an equation of “being” and “being known.” The movement from Being to knowledge in this limited framework would truly be unacceptable. But there are other possibilities which Bastide does not confront. As Dondeyne notes: “... the Thomist doctrine of knowledge is not in the last analysis a representational one.” Cf. A. Dondeyne, Contemporary European Thought and Christian Faith, Editions Nauwelaerts, Louvain, 1963 (2nd impression), p. 145.
Bastide here criticizes the approach of a philosophy which proceeds from what is supposedly given (ordo ordinatus) to what can be known about the given. For Bastide and for the idealists in general it is rather a question of seeing philosophy as invention and the promotion of an order to be constructed (ordo ordinans). It is, he says, the difference between the realist consciousness and the idealist consciousness and in the moral order between a system which is inherently conservative of the status quo and another which is necessarily continual progress. Cf. Les grands thèmes moraux, op. cit. p. 110.
That is, the original unity may be regarded axiologically as the term of the metaphysical intention and as the norm effective of a progressive unification or it can be regarded ontologically as the source, origin and cause of all that is. But the two ways cannot be brought together for they are opposed one to the other. Cf. Les grands thèmes, p. 103. On the ontological order neither dogmatism (the order of salvary) or individualism (order of revolution) have any authentic philosophical justification.
That is, once the question has been posed in an axiological and idealist framework.
Cf. G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 36.
Cf. also “The Metaphysical Dimensions of Man,” op. cit., p. 354.
Bastide’s philosophy of being and nothingness must be understood in the context of his moral idealism. Nothingness pertains to the order of exteriority and is engendered by the disorientation of man’s acts.
G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 41.
Id., p. 42.
Id.
For Bastide the function of the judgment is eminently axiological. Cf. La Condition humaine, p. 128, 222–234. Also: “Nolite Judicare,” op. cit., p. 395ss. The influence of Descartes and Kant becomes all the more evident in Bastide’s theory of truth.
Cf. Méditations, p. 45.
Cf. Méditations, p. 59.
Cf. Méditations, p. 59.
Id.
Id.
For Bastide the two Socratic paradoxes lose their ambiguity and are seen as true in a philosophy of spiritual conversion. It is the “practical intellectualism” and the speculative voluntarism that he sees also in the philosophy of Descartes and takes as the ideal of his own philosophy of action and spiritual conversion. Cf. Les grands thèmes, p. 140. Cf. also Le moment historique de Socrate, op. cit., p. 175. As Bastide notes: “Il suffit de connaître le bien pour le faire, car pour le sage, dans la connaissance éthique de soi, connaître et agir ne sont, au fond, qu’une seule chose,” p. 23. Les grands thèmes, en Socrates was neither a rationalist nor a pragmatist, but a man of the spirit.
But the act which has the consistency of the authentic value which supports it and not just any “act.” For Bastide it is impossible to distinguish action and passion except by the consideration of the Value which gives the act its authenticity. Cf. Traité, p. 357.
Cf. G. Bastide, “Les problèmes majeurs de l’axiologie,” Les études philosophiques, 1948, pp. 84–85.
G. Bastide, “Les problèmes majeurs,” Les études philosophiques, 1948, p. 85.
G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 60.
Id.
Id.
G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 60.
Id.
G. Bastide, Méditations, pp. 60–61.
Id., p. 61.
G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 62.
Bastide also points out the ambivalence of emotional movements of consciousness on the vital level of reality, due to the fact that it is nourished from two different sources. One source is the disadaptation factor of consciousness itself. The other source is the readaptation factor, with all the uncertainty of its outcome. It is on the emotional level that our higher affections and values become obscured. By his very nature man is a restless being (Cf. Le Senne, La découverte de Dieu, Paris, Aubier, 1955, p. 165). He can neither afford perfect rest or enjoy perfect activity. Tension is the very raison d’être of consciousness. The real problem of life is not the release of tension, but its maintenance in a just equilibrium. We love adventure, but hate the failure our actions can bring, or the loss of tranquility that activity seems to impose. We fear disadaptation, but we also love it. We need to follow and love some ideal, but we hate not being a part of the world where these ideals seem to be lacking. The love of what we love is rendered ambiguous at every turn. This essential bipolarity of value constitutes the essence of the new problematic and renders axiology insufficient to itself.
Cf. La condition humaine, pp. 34–35; also Méditations, p. 63.
Cf. Méditations, pp. 66–67.
G. Bastide, La conversion spirituelle, p. 1.
La condition humaine, p. 9.
Cf. G. Bastide, “Le malin génie,” op. cit. p. 239.
Cf. Traité, p. 128.
G. Bastide, La conversion spirituelle, p. 4.
Georges Bastide, La conversion spirituelle, pp. 4–6.
G. Bastide, “La nature, la conscience et la vie de l’esprit,” op. cit., p. 29.
Id.
Cf. G. Bastide, Traité, L, p. 209
For this reason Bastide rejects the individualism of R. Polin, La création des valeurs, Paris, P.U.F., 1944. As Lavelle notes Polin’s approach refuses to take into account the metaphysical supports which alone can ground an axiology. Cf. Traité des Valeurs, I., p. 145–146. (Paris, P.U.F.; 1951).
“If man reflects, it is in order to be authentic.” G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 144.
Id., p. 68.
Cf. G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 59.
G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 69.
Id.
Id.
Id., p. 70.
Id., p. 72.
G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 72.
Cf. G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 73.
“... there is no necessary relation between the order of rational explanation and the value of the practical motivations determining the goals of our actions.” G. Bastide, Traité, I., p. 37.
Cf. G. Bastide, Traité, I., p. 25.
Cf. Méditations, p. 76.
Cf. Méditations, p. 77.
Id.
Cf. G. Bastide, Traité, p. 357.
Cf. G. Bastide, Traité, I., p. 357.
G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 78.
G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 78.
Id.
“These two ways are precisely the ones experienced by Greek philosophy with the ethical idealism of Plato and the ontological realism of Aristotle.” G. Bastide, Les grands thèmes, op. cit., p. 103.
Cf. G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 80.
Cf. G. Bastide, Méditations, p. 81.
Cf. A. Dondeyne, op. cit., p. 170.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1971 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Koenig, T. (1971). Stating the Problem. In: The Philosophy of Georges Bastide. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3045-8_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3045-8_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-3047-2
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-3045-8
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive