Abstract
In the introduction to his Traité Georges Bastide remarks that “it would be just to note that the orientation of our work is in the tradition of the idealism of Brunschvicg, while that of Le Senne came more directly under the influence of the idealism of Hamelin.”1 “But it is no less true,” he continues, “that as far as the great names that preeceded are concerned, Maine de Biran, Ravaisson, Lachelier, Boutroux, Legneau and Bergson constitute our common heritage.”2 It is the purpose of this second chapter, then, to remark briefly the movement of French Idealism, especially as it came to be incorporated into the philosophy of Léon Brunschvicg, who, with Hamelin, represented the “principle movement” in contemporary French idealism.3 Hamelin followed a more synthetic method, “confident in the stability of the dialectical, relational construction of nature and spirit.”4 Brunschvicg, on the other hand, followed a more analytic method, seeking the laws of the spirit and the conditions of their revelation in experience and history. The reflexive method of Georges Bastide, who had Brunschvicg as his teacher, follows Brunschvicg’s approach in this regard. His own spiritual personalism and philosophy of interior transcendence, however, is a further development of Brunschvicg’s philosophy of immanence.
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References
G. Bastide, Traité, p. 2.
G. Bastide, Traité, p. 2.
Cf. A. Etcheverry, L’idéalisme français contemporain, Paris, Alcan, 1934, p. 44.
Cf. A. Etcheverry, L’idéalisme français contemporain, p. 44.
Cf. G. Bastide, De la condition humaine, pp. 305–323.
L. Brunschvicg, “L’orientation du rationalisme,” in Ecrits Philosophiques, II, Paris, 1954, p. 79.
“The science of pure thought, of the light in its source, is what we mean by metaphysics.” J. Lachelier, op. cit., p. 129.
J. Lachelier, “Annotation au vocabulaire de Lalande,” in Oeuvres, II, p. 210.
“Let us not fear to suspend in some way thought in a void; for it cannot rest except in itself: the final ground of support for every truth and every existence is the absolute spontaneity of spirit.” J. Lachelier, in Oeuvres, I., p. 208.
Cf. note 7 above.
Cf. G. Bastide, De la Condition humaine, p. 23.
L. Brunschvicg, La modalité du jugement, Paris, 1934, p. 4.
Cf. M. Deschoux, La philosophie de Leon Brunschvicg, Paris, P.U.F., 1949, p. 1.
L. Brunschvicg, La modalité du jugement, p. 236.
L. Brunschvicg, op. cit., p. 27.
L. Brunschvicg, De la connaissance de soi, Paris, 1931, pp. x–xi.
R. Boirel, Brunschvicg (coll. “Philosophes” P.U.F.), Paris, 1964, p. 34.
Cf. G. Bastide, Traité, I., p. 151–152.
J. Vialatoux, La morale de Kant (coll. “Initiation Philosophique” 22), Paris, P.U.F., 1966 (4th edition), p. 47. with note. Cf. also I. Kant, Critique of Pure Practical Reason, book I, chapter III.
L. Brunschvicg, Le progrès de la conscience dans la philosophie occidentale, Paris, P.U.F., 1953, p. 741.
L. Brunschvicg, La modalité du jugement, p. 24.
L. Brunschvicg, La modalité du jugement, p. 80.
L. Brunschvicg, “L’idée de la vérité mathématique,” in Ecrits III, pp. 71–72.
L. Brunschvicg, La modalité du jugement, p. 81 and p. 90.
For Brunschvicg the nature of being depends on the nature of the affirmation of being, since thought is considered as a function constitutive of being. Cf. p. 78 of La modalité du jugement.
L. Brunschvicg, La modalité du jugement, p. 91.
“Exteriority is not, for us, some thing; exteriority is only a principle of affirmation grounding the affirmation of being.” Ibid., p. 92.
“There is no reason to seek a common measure between spirit and that which is not spirit.” Ibid., p. 92.
Cf. G. Bastide, Traité, p. 277 ss.
L. Brunschvicg, La modalité du jugement, p. 41.
Cf. M. Deschoux, La philosophie de Léon Brunschvicg, p. 69 op. cit.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 77.
Cf. note 22 of this section.
We shall see a further development of this notion of consciousness as tension in Bastide’s axiology.
Bastide proposes to study especially the historical movement of the spirit coming to reflection in his philosophy of consciousness (De la condition humaine), his study of the historical figure Socrates (Le moment historique de Socrates), in the determination of the authentic notion of civilization (Les mirages et certitudes de la civilization) and finally in the history of philosophy (Les grands thèmes moraux de la civilization occidentale).
Cf. M. Deschoux, La philosophie de Léon Brunschvicg, p. 77.
Cf. M. Deschoux, La philosophie de Léon Brunschvicg, p. 77.
L. Brunschvicg, Les étapes de la philosophie mathématique, p. 561, op. cit.
Cf. M. Deschoux, op. cit., p. 83. Note also Brunschvicg’s critique of Descartes in the Modalité du Jugement, pp. 51–62.
Cf. L’Expérience humaine et la causalité physique, Paris, P.U.F., 1949 (third edition), 601 pp.
L. Brunschvicg, L’Expérience humaine et la causalité physique, op. cit., pp. 538–539.
L’Expérience humaine et la causalité physique, op. cit., p. 537 under Brunschvicg’s comments concerning Einstein.
M. Deschoux, op. cit., p. 98.
M. Deschoux, p. 98 op. cit.
“Moral progress therefore will demand the same reversal from immediate perspectives demanded by progress on the part of our intelligence, the same radical displacement of our interests and our satisfactions.” L. Brunschvicg, La modalité du jugement, p. v of the preface to the second edition, op. cit.
Cf. G. Bastide, “La spiritualité brunschvicgienne,” Revue de Métaphysique et de morale, 1945 (50), p. 43.
Cf. Léon Brunschvicg, Le progrès de la conscience, pp. 145–154, p. 685, p. 694.
M. Deschoux, op. cit., p. 130.
E. Brehier, “L’idéalisme de Léon Brunschvicg,” in Etudes de philosophie moderne, Paris, P.U.F., 1965, p. 152.
L. Brunschvicg, “Sur les rapports de la conscience intellectuelle et de la conscience morale,” in Ecrits philosophiques, II., p. 153.
L. Branschvicg, La modalité du jugement, p. 244.
“The life of the spirit is found entirely in the scientific life.” M. Deschoux, op. cit., p. 143.
M. Deschoux, op. cit., p. 143.
Both Brunschvicg and Bastide note their agreement with F. Rauh and the nature of moral experience. Cf. L. Brunschvicg, “Frédéric Rauh,” in Ecrits, II, pp. 232–257. Cf. G. Bastide, Traité, p. 24, 386.
For Brunschvicg the functions of the spirit are not conceived in terms of faculties. Spirit is not to be conceived as divided between instinct, sentiment and will on the one hand and reflection, reason and liberty on the other. The problem of liberty takes its origin from the deep rooted sentiment of the unity of our interior, life. Thus we think and act with the totality of our being. The meaning of freedom, for Brunschvicg, must be found in this notion of our being taken us a whole. In other words there is nothing in us heterogeneous to reason. Our feelings can become permeated by reason just as emotion can engender abstract ideas. Liberty is activated in man’s spirit in proportion as the spirit passes from unconsciousness to consciousness, that is, to reflection. Cf. “La notion de liberté morale,” in Ecrits, II., pp. 164–182.
In the tradition of Descartes, the unity and primacy of the spirit are among the central intuitions of Brunschvicg’s philosophy. Cf. “La spiritualité,” G. Bastide, pp. 98–99.
Cf. G. Bastide, De la condition humaine, p. 313.
Cf. G. Bastide, De la condition humaine, p. 319.
Cf. M. Deschoux, “Brunschvicg et Bergson,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 1951 (15), p. 101.
Cf. L. Brunschvicg, “De la vraie et de la fausse Conversion,” Revue de Métaphysique et de morale, 1930–1932, pp. 270–297 (1930); 29–80, 187–235 (1931); 17–46. 153–198 (1932). Cf. H. Bergson, La pensée et le mouvant in Oeuvres (édition du centenaire), 153, p. 1373: “Is not the role of philosophy to bring us to a more complete perception of reality by way of certain displacement of our attention? It would seem to have to do with turning our attention away from the pragmatically interesting aspect of the universe and turning it back towards that which is, practically speaking, of no use. This conversion of our attention would be philosophy itself.”
H. Bergson, La pensée et le mouvant, p. 1432 (1930).
Cf. H. Bergson, La pensée et le mouvant, p. 1255–1256 (1930).
Cf. H. Bergson, La pensée et le mouvant, p. 1255 (1930).
Cf. H. Bergson also L’Évolution créatrice, xi, p. 494 (1930).
“That is to say that the theory of knowledge and a theory of life seem to us to be inseparable from one another.” H. Bergson, L’Évolution créatrice, ix, p. 492, (1930).
Cf. H. Bergson, L’Évolution créatrice, 356 ss., pp. 796–801, (1930).
“L’explication concrète, non plus scientifique, mais métaphysique, doit être cherchée dans une tout autre voie, non plus dans la direction de l’intelligence, mais dans celle de la “sympathie.” L’instinct est sympathie... Mais c’est à l’intérieur même de la vie que nous conduirait l’intuition, je veux dire l’instinct devenu désintéressé, conscient de lui-même, capable de réfléchir sur son objet et de l’alargir indéfiniment.” H. Bergson, L’Évolution créatrice, 177–178, pp. 644–645 (1930).
Cf. H. Bergson, La pensée et le mouvant, p. 1395 and p. 1273 (1930).
The notion of purification continues to play an essential role in the philosophies of spirit. The way of self-knowledge through asceticism, already prominent in platonic and neo-platonic philosophy, is regarded as the way to Being itself, the source of absolute reality. The Essai of Bergson is also the declaration of a spiritual conversion and a free creation mediated by certain necessary purifications. Cf. J. Lacroix, in Encyclopédie française, T. XIX, p. 19.04-2.
Of. H. Bergson, La pensée et le mouvant, pp. 1273–1274 op. cit.
Ibid., p. 1361 op. cit.
Cf. H. Bergson, La pensée et le mouvant, 142, p. 1365 op. cit.
Ibid., p. 1421.
Ibid., p. 1420.
Cf. H. Bergson, L’Évolution créatrice, pp. 716–718 op. cit. Cf. also L’Energie spirituelle, p. 824: “Consciousness is freedom. It is precisely freedom immersing itself in necessity and turning it to its own profit.”
L’Évolution créatrice, p. 724 op. cit.
Cf. H. Bergson, Matière et mémoire, p. 166 op. cit.
Cf. H. Bergson, L’Évolution créatrice, p. 724 op. cit.
Cf. H. Bergson, Les deux sources de la Morale et de la Religion, p. 1024 and pp. 1029–29 op. cit.
G. Bastide, Mirages et certitudes, p. 188.
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Koenig, T. (1971). Leon Brunschvicg and Henri Bergson. In: The Philosophy of Georges Bastide. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3045-8_2
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