Abstract
The decision to treat the theories of the body presented by Marcel, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty was neither hasty nor arbitrary. For, despite the many important differences among their respective theories (and even more, in their philosophies), it has become apparent that there are several striking, indeed fundamental, similarities among them. To preface our concluding remarks, then, it seems advisable to state explicitly these common grounds before we attempt to delineate the significance and direction of our study as a whole.
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References
Cf. M. Natanson, “Existential Categories in Contemporary Literature,” Carolina Quarterly (1959), pp. 17–30, esp. p. 19: “What I take to be central and decisive for all existentialist philosophy is a concern for what I wish to call man’s being in reality.” Cf. also his article, “Being-In-Reality,” PPR, vol. xx, no, 2 (Dec, 1959), pp. 231–237.
See above, Part III, Chapter I, footnote 2, p. 131.
Cf. Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., p. 97.
Cf. Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., pp. 11–18, for the systematic treatment of Evidenz.
Ibid., p. 50; cf. also, pp. 51–53.
Ibid., p. 97.
Cf. ibid., pp. 77–80.
Cf. above, Part III, Chapter III, pp. 204–233.
Cf. Cartesian Meditations, Meditations IV and V.
We borrow this apt phrase from Alfred Schütz, “Symbol, Reality and Society,” in: L. Bryson, et al (editors), Symbols and Society, 14th Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, Harper Bros. (New York, 1955), pp. 154–56.
Ibid., Idem.
Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., p. 97.
Ideen., II, op. cit., pp. 145–46.
Ibid., p. 146.
Cf. Erfahrung und Urteil, op. cit., §§ 17–21.
Cf. Cartesian Meditations, p. 97; and Ideen, II, op. cit., p. 56.
Ideen, II, p. 65.
But not causality in the sense used by natural science; cf. Maurice Natanson, “Causality as a Structure of the Lebenswelt,” Journal of Existential Psychiatry, Vol. I, No. 3 (Fall, 1960), pp. 346–66. It is a question of “lived causality,” the way in which the regularities of the world, the body, and objects are concretely lived.
Cf. Ideen, II, pp. 62–63.
Husserl, Erste Philosophie (1923/24), Zweiter Teil, Martinus Nijhoff, Husserliana Band VIII (Haag, 1959), pp. 60–61.
Formale und transzendentale Logik, op. cit., p. 213.
Erste Philosophie, II, op. cit., p. 61. “So,” he continues, “in einem erfahrenden Blick die Hand und in ihrer Bewegung die doppelseitige psychophysische Bewegung die spezifisch leibliche Bewegung.” (loc. cit.)
The Soul in Metaphysical and Empirical Psychology, Duquesne University (Pittsburgh, 1957), pp. 142–50.
Ideen, J, op. cit., p. 103. The significance of the relation of the body to the constitution of Others and thereby to the common social world is also indicated here.
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© 1971 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Zaner, R.M. (1971). Epilogue. In: The Problem of Embodiment. Phaenomenologica, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3014-4_10
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