Knowledge and Analogy

Abstract

Since we name as we know, there is always a priority of knowledge with respect to that mode of signification called the analogy of names. Moreover, in the realm of knowledge, there is a use of the term “analogy” which must be distinguished from its use as signifying a type of name. Thus, we speak of reasoning from analogy, coming to know something by an analogy with something else. Such knowledge sometimes occasions an analogous name, at others does not; consequently it must be distinguished from the analogy of names. In drawing this distinction, we shall be calling into question Cajetan’s interpretation of the role that proportionality plays in the analogy of names. As a sign of the difficulties inherent in his interpretation, we can recall his subdividing of proportionality, which for him is analogy par excellence, into proper and improper. The former is an analogous name, the latter, curiously enough, is not, although he seems to feel that it has as much claim to the title as what he calls attribution. This suggests that the proportionality is not itself constitutive of the analogous name. Given the difficulty involved in ascertaining the status of metaphor in Cajetan’s interpretation, we believe that one of the merits of this chapter is that it provides a clear-cut distinction between metaphor and analogous names. Moreover, knowledge from analogy will be seen as that which can occasion either a metaphor or an analogous name.