Phenomenology: A Break-Through to a New Intuitionism

Abstract

The notion of “Intuition” permits a wide range of ambiguity in philosophical investigations. Whatever be the exact import of the notion in use — and in whatever context (generally metaphysical) — the tradition of “intuitionism” generally stands for the view that all knowledge in the long run is constructed out of intuitive comprehension, in opposition to discursive thinking. In the development of European thought intuitionistic trends in some form or other can well be traced right from Plato, and then more conspicuously in Neo-Platonism. Again in its rationalistic orientation the tradition appears to occur in the philosophies of Descartes and subsequent Rationalists, and then leading further to German Idealism culminating with the philosophy of Hegel. However, the most outstanding and exclusive expression of this tradition in modern philosophy is to be met with in Bergson’s philosophy — in his unambiguous contention that philosophizing lies in “sinking oneself in the object” through an exercise of the special faculty of intuition.