Abstract
It often happens that a single bit of behavior is described in several different ways; and, as is well known, a bit of behavior under one description may be intentional or voluntary or exonerable, but none of these under another. There is, however, but one thing done; it is simply described in many ways. It is also maintained, though not so often, that there cannot be many descriptions of a single bit of behavior, except perhaps in ways unimportant to philosophers. Many different descriptions signal as many different things done.
An earlier version of this chapter appeared as an article in Inquiry, XIII. 1–2 (Summer 1970), 90–99.
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References
Cf. G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford: Blackwell’s, 1963), p. 38: “‘He is X-ing’ is a description of an intentional action if (a) it is true and (b) there is such a thing as an answer in the range I have defined to the question ‘Why are you X-ing?’” My use of Q 4 is similar to Anscombe’s use of the question “Why?” with the special emphasis she assigns to it in Intention. But she is concerned to sort out intentional actions using this question. I use Q 4, and Q 1–Q 3, to sort out bound actions from among given bits of behavior, and to sort the remainder into two types of unbound action and mere doings. In Chapter VI, I will argue that these four kinds of behavior correspond to voluntary, two types of involuntary, and nonvoluntary behavior; I will, moreover, argue for a distinction between intentional and unintentional behavior and that all, but not only, bound actions are intentional.
Arthur B. Cody, “Can a Single Action Have Many Different Descriptions?” Inquiry, X.2 (Summer 1967), 164–180.
See also: R. E. Dowling, “‘Can an Action Have Many Descriptions?’” Inquiry, X.4 (Winter 1967), 447–448
Inquiry, X.4 (Winter 1967), **) Cody, “A Reply to Mr. Dowling,” ibid., 449–452. Dowling’s argument against Cody is the following: “Dr. Cody does not say why his thesis should not be generalized and extend beyond actions to everything else, leading to the conclusion that each material object (say) can have one and only one description; but, since the falsity of this conclusion proves that there must be something wrong with the general thesis, it is worth showing that Cody’s thesis does seem to involve him in the more general and more obviously false one” (447). Since I submitted the final proofs of “On Describing Actions” to Inquiry, I have seen another reply to Cody’s paper. This is “The Same Action,” a paper read before the Aristotelian Society, at the meeting of 8 December 1969, by Michael Cohen. I shall return, in Section 24, to consider a point raised by Cohen.
“Can a Single Action Have Many Different Descriptions?” 166.
Ibid., 165.
Ibid.
Recall Dowling’s argument against Cody (Note 53), and compare J. L. Austin on sticks in water, Sense and Sensibilia (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 29.
“Action and Responsibility,” p. 146.
Ruth Macklin, “Actions, Consequences, and Ethical Theory,” Journal of Value Inquiry, I.1 (Spring 1967), 76.
Arthur Danto, “Basic Actions,” in A. R. White, ed., The Philosophy of Action (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 43–58—see especially p. 52 ff.
Cf. “Can a Single Action Have Many Different Descriptions?” 174.
“The Same Action,” 89.
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© 1972 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Rayfield, D. (1972). On Describing Actions. In: Action: An Analysis of the Concept. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2807-3_5
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