Critique of Behavioralism in Political Science

Abstract

I am writing neither to condemn behavioralism in political science, nor to praise or bury it. Advocates and practitioners of behavioralism are in the habit of blowing their own horn so loudly, that the addition of laudatory sounds from an outsider inclined to intone them would make for cacophony. Burial, too, seems inappropriate, since reports of the death of behavioralism¹ are, in Mark Twain’s words, greatly exaggerated. A critique is an expression of reasoned judgment upon a matter, and it may involve a judgment on the matter’s “value, truth, or righteousness or an appreciation of its beauty or technique”. In this sense of the word, many critiques of behavioralism in political science have been offered during the past. Most if not all express judgments about the righteousness of behavioral political studies. Some view righteousness from the right, others from the left. The former have, on occasion, chided behavioralists for pretending to know more than anyone can know, and to want to do more than anyone should do, about political behavior.³ The latter, on the other hand, have more often complained that behavioralists seek to explain phenomena that are poorly if not malignantly selected, and that their work has served apolitical, antipolitical, or at best uncritical purposes.⁴