Abstract
In the previous chapter I described reconstructionism, quite generally, as a method of analysis whereby propositions in ordinary language are reformulated so as to rid them of their misleading grammatical forms and exhibit the true constituents of facts they may assert. So characterized, reconstructionism may be said to represent the common denominator of a number of somewhat diverse analytic techniques employed by Russell at various times, collected under a single rubric. Professor Weitz has suggested — correctly, I believe — that there is a basic similarity between the analytic techniques Russell calls, variously, (I) the analysis of denoting phrases, (2) the analysis of incomplete symbols, (3) constructionism, and (4) the principle which dispenses with abstractionism.1 All of these, it seems to me, aim at accomplishing the purpose I have indicated as the overall aim of reconstructionism, taken as a general method. As I am using the term, then, “reconstructionism” signifies not so much a single method as a “family” of analytic methods that have an essentially common function.
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© 1972 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Clack, R.J. (1972). The Uses of Reconstructionism. In: Bertrand Russell’s Philosophy of Language. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2723-6_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2723-6_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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