Abstract
This paper marshals a case against some popular versions of determinism and in favour of partial indeterminism. First, a variety of versions of determinism and indeterminism is displayed, from which a few are selected for closer examination. Secondly, a clash is exposed between determinism and a necessary condition of the sort of freedom we might like to think we have. Thirdly, it is argued that several versions of partial indeterminism chime better nowadays with science than does determinism, which thus loses the underpinning it has enjoyed in the modern period.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1973 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Settle, T. (1973). Human Freedom and 1568 Versions of Determinism and Indeterminism. In: Bunge, M. (eds) The Methodological Unity of Science. Theory and Decision Library, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2667-3_12
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2667-3_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0404-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-2667-3
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive