Defense of a Non-Conventionalist Interpretation of Classical Mechanics

Abstract

In an earlier paper [15] I have outlined and defended a version of Scientific Realism. According to that doctrine, theories are imaginative attempts to grasp the true nature of a universe apprehended very imperfectly via the senses; they are intended literal truths (though very likely all false in fact); the correlative epistemology is naturalistic, being informed by, and in turn informing, the science of human beings. In that paper I described an alternative theory of science, which I called (after the historical tradition) Conventionalism. This theory holds that (i) there is a sharp, objective observational/theoretical dichotomy within the terms of science and (ii) all sentences in science with certain theoretical terms are to be regarded as expressing conventions (or partial conventions) for the Unking together of observational terms. Epistemologically, the purely observational level offers the only empirical content of science. These two positions are in utter opposition ontologically, epistemologically and semantically.

This paper grew out of a seminar on the foundations of Classical Mechanics held at Sydney University during 1967. Other members of the seminar were Dr. W. A. Suchting (Director), Mr. K. Campbell and Mr. I. Hunt. Clearly it is to be expected that the development of the paper owes a great deal to these people. At a general level, the development of the foundations of Classical Mechanics in part III owes much to ideas put forward by Suchting in conversation whilst the role of arguments surrounding energy in the conventionalist controversy (part VII) also benefited from his criticisms. Mr. Hunt has since offered detailed criticism of earlier drafts of this paper and I am especially indebted to him for his critical analysis of the relevance of Grünbaum’s metrical thesis to the issue of conventionality (though Grünbaum’s own, recent, analysis — see [8] — has also helped greatly in this respect). Since that time the material has been presented to a graduate seminar at the University of Western Ontario whose members were Messrs. P. English, B. Fargen, M. Moffa, R. Slack and the arguments of the earlier sections especially owe much to their careful criticism. Where further acknowledgement is appropriate and can be more specific, it will be given.