Abstract
In this investigation I produce a mathematically precise theory of conceptual structures which I believe to be essential to the solution of problems arising from the phenomenon of theoretical change. Many accounts of theoretical change in the literature fail to do justice to the different kinds of theoretical change which in fact take place. This deficiency is due to a studied myopia probably having its antecedents in positivistic theories in which everything is simple. The view that theoretical change is all of one kind is an invariant through otherwise conflicting positions. It seems clear, then, that this traditional view should be rejected.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Bibliography
Bell, J. L. and Slomson, A. B„ 1969, Models and Ultraproducts, Amsterdam.
Bub, Jeffrey, 1973, ‘On the Completeness of Quantum Mechanics’, in Contemporary Research in the Foundations of Quantum Theory (ed. by C. Hooker ), D. Reidel, Dordrecht, p. 1.
Davidson, Donald and Hintikka, Jaakko (eds.), 1969, Words and Objections Essays: on the Work of W. V. Quine, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.
Finkelstein, David, 1969, ‘Matter, Space and Logic’ in Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. V (ed. by R. Cohen and M. Wartofsky ), D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 199–215.
Kochen, S. and Specker, E. P., 1967, ‘The Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics’, Journal of Mathematics and Mechanics 17, 59–87.
Nagel, E., 1961, The Structure of Science, New York.
Putnam, H., 1969, ‘Is Logic Empirical?’ in Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. V (ed. by R. Cohen and M. Wartofsky ), D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 216–41.
Quine, W. V., 1963a, ‘Identity, Ostension and Hypostasis’, in From a Logical Point of View, (ed. by W. V. Quine), 2nd ed., New York pp. 65–79.
Quine, W. V., 1970a, ‘On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation’, The Journal of Philosophy 67, 179–81.
Quine, W. V., 1966, ‘Ontological Reduction and the World of Numbers’, in The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays (ed. W. V. Quine), New York, pp. 199–207.
Quine, W. V., 1969a, ‘Ontological Relativity’, in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (ed. by W. V. Quine ), New York, pp. 26–68.
Quine, W. V., 1970b, ‘Philosophical Progress in Language Theory’, in Language, Belief and Metaphysics (ed. by H. Keifer and M. Munitz), Albany, pp. 3–18.
Quine, W. V., 1963b, Set Theory and Its Logic, Cambridge, Mass.
Quine, W. V., 1969b, ‘Speaking of Objects’, in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (ed. by W. V. Quine ), New York, pp. 1–25.
Quine, W. V., 1963c, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in From a Logical Point of View (ed. by W. V. Quine), 2nd ed., New York, pp. 20–46.
Quine, W. V., 1960, Word and Object, Cambridge, Mass.
Raisowa, H. and Sikorski, R., 1968, The Mathematics of Metamathematics, 2nd ed., Warsaw.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1973 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hockney, D. (1973). Conceptual Structures. In: Pearce, G., Maynard, P. (eds) Conceptual Change. Synthese Library, vol 52. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2548-5_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2548-5_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0339-2
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-2548-5
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive