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Evidence, Meaning and Conceptual Change: A Subjective Approach

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Conceptual Change

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 52))

Abstract

Conceptual change is replete with semantic and epistemic implications. Fundamental changes in the way in which we conceive of the world formulated in laws and theories shift the meaning of words and the content of evidence. It is controversial whether conceptual change always shifts the meaning of terms in our laws and theories.1 However, what statements we countenance as evidence may be altered whether or not conceptual change alters the meaning of words. Our main purpose in this paper is to formulate a theory of evidence explaining how conceptual change alters, not only what we infer from evidence, but the very content of evidence itself.

Research for this paper was supported by the National Sciences Foundation.

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© 1973 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland

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Lehrer, K. (1973). Evidence, Meaning and Conceptual Change: A Subjective Approach. In: Pearce, G., Maynard, P. (eds) Conceptual Change. Synthese Library, vol 52. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2548-5_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2548-5_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0339-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-2548-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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