Abstract
There are statements and judgements which, prima facie, are generalizations but whose truth we maintain in the face of exceptions. ‘A cheetah can outrun a man.’1 Hobbled, injured and drugged cheetahs are cheetahs. Not all of these can outrun any man. Thus, although it is true that a cheetah can outrun a man, it is also true that not all cheetahs can do so. Is this a consistent thing to say?
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References
Achinstein, P., 1965, ‘“Defeasible” Problems’, The Journal of Philosophy 62, 629–33.
Clark, R., 1956, ‘Natural Inference’, Mind 65, 455–72.
Sellars, W., 1953, ‘Inference and Meaning’, Mind 62, 313–38.
Stalnaker, R. C., 1968, ‘A Theory of Conditionals’, Studies in Logical Theory (ed. by N. Rescher). American Philosophical Quarterly: Monograph Series, Monograph No. 2 Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 98–112.
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© 1973 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland
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Clark, R. (1973). Prima Facie Generalizations. In: Pearce, G., Maynard, P. (eds) Conceptual Change. Synthese Library, vol 52. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2548-5_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2548-5_3
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