Theory Change in Science

Abstract

Nowadays theories about science change even more rapidly than science itself. Not too long ago nearly everyone would have agreed that the primary method of criticizing scientific theories was falsification; (the disagreements were over what positive things could be said about theories which survived testing). Then Kuhn (1962) discovered normal science and Agassi (1966) argued that Boyle’s Rule was dogmatic (why should one always keep the experimental result and drop the theory?) and so it was suggested that the method of science was the removal of inconsistencies, preferably not by ad hoc stratagems. However Feyerabend (1962) soon showed that the demand for consistency was much too stringent since most progressive new scientific theories were inconsistent with the best theories and observational evidence available at the time. Lakatos (1970) then proposed a sort of Pollyanna theory of science — scientific research programs should be evaluated by counting only their successes and ignoring their failures. But Feyerabend (1970) argued that even this standard was too restrictive and claimed that the methods of science were counter-induction, proliferation, and “anything goes.”

… the crucial point that should never be forgotten in the history of ideas…: one may have been influenced profoundly by others and yet be strikingly original and even revolutionary. What makes the study of history fascinating is among other things, the perception of discontinuity in the context of continuity. The historically ignorant believe in absolute novelty; those with a smattering of history are apt to believe in no novelty at all: they are blinded by the discovery of similarities. Beyond that, however, lies the discovery of small, but sometimes crucial, differences. Kaufmann, Faith of a Heretic