- 118 Downloads
The philosophy of science fathered by Russell, Schlick, and the Vienna Circle, was centrally concerned with induction and, under the spell of Wittgenstein, it moved into the philosophy of language. In particular, that philosophy tried to elucidate the notions of verifiability, inductive support (or degree of confirmation), and cognitive meaningfulness. Eventually it went so far as to equate meaningfulness and testability, and to reduce the latter to confirmability. This was a shift from chimaeric metaphysical enterprises, like the phenomenalist reconstruction of science, to methodological and linguistic issues. This change in emphasis proved healthy for the philosophy of science, as it called for the discussion of some live science (not much, though) and for linguistic neatness, even though it ended up in the muddle of the verifiability doctrine of meaning, which promoted neither semantics nor methodology.
KeywordsScientific Theory Specific Theory Automaton Theory Demarcation Line Classical Field Theory
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.