Abstract
There are definitions of sentences through truth-values. This is in particular possible if one assumes that a sentence is that which can be true or false. But this is an insufficient definition. One has to know what a sentence is before one talks about its properties such as truth, falsity, etc. While one can attain a certain illusion of immediate clarity in reference to truth and falsity, for other truth-values (which are possible and have to be included in a definition of truth) this is not possible. Relative to certain forms of sentences even the terms “true” and “false” have no immediate clarity.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1973 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Zinov’ev, A.A. (1973). Sentences. In: Foundations of the Logical Theory of Scientific Knowledge (Complex Logic). Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2501-0_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2501-0_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0324-8
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-2501-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive