Abstract
In the English language the verb “to discriminate” (and words derived from it: “discrimination,” “discriminating” and so on) has two different meanings.1 It can be used in a neutral sense: “to distinguish,” “to differentiate” between (people, things, or whatever). In this original sense the word is found in learned dissertations, in works written in a scholarly style.2 Occasionally it also appears in a literary work.3 Secondly, the word can be used (and is most frequently used now) in a pejorative sense: to discriminate against, meaning “to make an adverse distinction,” “to distinguish unfavourably from others.” The Dictionary quoted gives examples of the expression employed in this sense, all in a social and political context4; and generally the term has this pejorative meaning when it is used in a social context, where it implies not an abstract distinction, but social action. In this latter sense it was adopted in other languages; in German for example, the word “Diskriminierung” can be used in this pejorative sense only5 and the same is true for French,6 Russian7 and Dutch.
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References
This is true for old and for modern English, though in the notes we only refer to historic examples. See for the following A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Vol. III, D and E, edited by Dr. James A. H. Murray (Oxford 1897) p. 436–437. See generally W. A. McKean, “The Meaning of Discrimination in International and Municipal Law,” in British Yearbook of International Law 1970, p. 177 ff.
Loc. cit. For example Bacon (1626), Malthus (1789) and others quoted in the Dictionary.
E.g. Prynne (1628), ibidem.
“I did not propose to be discriminated against on account of my nationality” (Mark Twain, A Tramp Abroad, 1880); “The action of the German Government in discriminating againts certain imports from the United States…” (Pall Mall, 1885); “If the Police, as the Socialists de clare, discriminate against them on account of their opinions…” (Pall Mall, 1886). Ibidem.
Schindler, op.cit. p. 67; G. Jaenicke, Der Begriff der Diskriminierung im modernen Völkerrecht (Berlin 1940), p. 12.
Jean Pictet: “… discrimination… terme nouveau, toujours péjoratif…” Principes du droit international humanitaire, Genève 1966, p. 41.
In the Commission on Human Rights the delegate from the Soviet Union explained that “the word ‘discrimination’ in Russian clearly referred to unfair, unequal treatment.” (E/CN.4/SR.52, p. 11).
Jaenicke, op.cit., p. 10, points especially at the speeches of President Wilson during and after the First World War (and his activities at the Paris Peace Conference).
For instance in Art. 4 of the Statute on the Régime of Navigable Waterways of Inter national Concern (Barcelona 1921): “No distinction shall be made between the nationals…” (Text in Hudson, International Legislation, Vol. I, p. 645 ff.). Also Article 2 of the Statute on the Freedom of Transit (Barcelona, 1921): “No distinction shall be based upon the nationality of persons…” (Text in Hudson, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 637 ff.). Compare also the Convention on the Revision of the General Act of Berlin (St. Germain, 1919), art. 2, 3 and 4: “No differential treatment shall be imposed upon the merchandise…”; “Vessels… shall be subject to no differential treatment”; “Nationals… shall enjoy without distinction the same treatment”; “… no regulations… shall admit of any differential treatment between the nationals…” (Text in Hudson, op.cit., p. 343 ff).
Hudson, International Legislation, Vol. I, p. 116.
Institut de Droit International, Session de New York (1929), Vol. II, p. 300.
(Paris 1960), p. 217.
As another example of this terminology the “discriminating concept of war” (compare G. Dahm, Völkerrecht, Vol. II, Stuttgart 1961, p. 328–331) could be mentioned, which refers to the position taken by third States with regard to an armed conflict. Given the validity of a rule prohibiting the use of force and consequently the distinction between “just” and “un just” war, third States are no longer bound to observe strictly equal treatment of the aggres sor and the party attacked by him, but should favour the latter. In the light of the pro hibition to use force the unfavourable unequal treatment that is given to the aggressor, and frequently referred to as “discrimination,” must be regarded as perfectly reasonable.
See generally H. Meyrowitz, Le Principe d’égalité des belligérants devant le droit de la guerre, (Paris 1970).
E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.3 (1947), p. 6.
M. Sørensen, “The Quest for Equality,” International Conciliation No. 507, (March 1956), p. 293.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/4o/Rev.1 (1949).
Paragraph 88 (p. 26).
E/CN.4/52, p. 13.
Berlin 1940.
“… Grundsätzlich der Tatbestand einer völkerrechtswidrigen unterschiedlichen Behandlung.” Op.cit., p. 14.
2nd ed., 1960, Vol. I, pp. 387–392.
“Die Völkerrechtspraxis verwendet [den Begriff Diskriminierung] heute zur Bezeignungeiner unzulässiger unterschiedlichen Behandlung.”
H. Kipp, “Das Verbot der Diskriminierung im modernen Friedensvölkerrecht,” in: Archiv des Völkerrechts, Vol. IX, (1961/62), p. 137 ff. at p. 140/41.
Italics added. (Free) translation by the present author of “Diskriminierung kann (…) als ungleiche Behandlung gleicher Objekte oder gleicher Sachverhalte definiert werden.” “Von diskriminierung oder unterschiedlicher Behandlung gleicher Objekte wird dann zu sprechen sein, wenn zwischen der Unterschiedlichkeit der Behandlung dieser Objekte, und jenen Gesichtspunkte, an denen sie sich orientiert, kein sinnvoller Zusammenhang besteht.”
R.I.A.A. Vol. XIII, p. 607. (S.A. Filatures de Schuppe).
P.C.I.J. Series A/B, No. 64 (1935), p. 19.
Of the Albanian Declaration of October 2nd, 1921, made after its admission to the League of Nations, concerning the protection of minorities in Albania. The first sentence of Art. 5 (1) runs as follows: “Albanian nationals who belong to racial, linguistic or religious minorities, will enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Albanian nationals.” See below p. 145.
Advisory Opinion of September 10th, 1923. Series B, no. 6. (German Settlers), at p. 24.
See above, p. 50. Three members of the majority in the present Opinion had voted for the Déclaration in 1929 (Rolin-Jaecquemyns, Altamira and Schücking). So had one dissenter (Negulesco); the dissenting President Hurst had voted against the Déclaration. See Annuaire de l’I.D.I. 1929, Vol. II, p. 137–138. See on this leading case further below, p. 145 f.
Judgment of 23 July, 1968. Text in Case “Relating to certain aspects of the laws on the sue of languages in education in Belgium” (Merits), Strasbourg 1968, p. 34.
“Völkerrechtswidrigkeit.” We do not think that Guggenheim intended to offer an explicit definition of the Jaenicke type with his repeated description of discrimination as a “distinction illicite.” It comes close to it, but he does not say “illégale.” (Paul Guggenheim, “Quelques remarques au sujet de l’article 14 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’Homme,” in René Cassin Amicorum Discipulorumgue Liber, Vol. I, Problèmes de protection internationale des droits de l’Homme, Paris 1969, p. 95 ff., at p. 98).
Op.cit., p. 16. The author discusses discrimination as between States.
Compare also the criticism by Kipp, Op.cit., p. 138–139.
Text in U.N.T.S., Vol. 494, p. 250 ff.
Compare on this distinction H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, p. 118; also General Theory of Law and State (Cambridge, Mass., 1946). p. 51–52.
Strupp-Schlochauer, Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts, (2nd ed., Berlin 1960). Vol. I, p. 387 ff.
Compare Jaenicke, Der Begriff der Diskriminierung im modernen Völkerrecht, p. 20.
Resulting in a definition such as the one given in The Main Types and Causes of Dis crimination, reproduced above, in § 25 under (c).
See further on this below, p. 133 ff.
See above, § 4.
Arnold Brecht, Political Theory (Princeton 1959), p. 396, and especially Ch. XI, “Truth and Justice” (p. 404 ff).
Op.cit., p. 408, 409. Compare similarly Julius Stone’s third “Quasi-absolute Precept of Material Justice”: “It is always incumbent on an actor to discover with maximum possible accuracy all aspects of the situation in which he acts or fails to act.” (Op.cit., p. 341).
A very interesting instance of this problem can be found in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (I.C.J., Reports 1969, p. 3 ff). In these cases one of the issues was how the “just and equitable share” of the Continental shelf, to which each coastal State is entitled, should be deliminated. Should only the geographical factors be taken into account, that is to say, should the delimination be based on the surface of the shelf, or should the notion of a “just and equitable share” be rested on a notion of opportioning the natural resources in the shelf? In the latter case, it might be argued, the already existing natural resources of the parties should also be compared. An additional problem was the fact that it was not quite clear how much information as to the exact quantities of natural resources in the shelf was available to the parties in the dispute. See on this aspect of the Cases the Separate Opinion of Judge Jessup, loc. cit., p. 67 ff.
G. Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie (6th ed., Stuttgart 1963), p. 100.
See also our Note on “Non-Discrimination and Justice,” in Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Vol. LVII (1971), p. 201.
R. G. Lipsey and P. O. Steiner, Economics (New York and Tokyo, 1966), p. 273 (Italics in original).
C. A. Emge, Einführung in die Rechtsphilosophie (Frankfurt a.M., Wien, 1956), p. 172 ff.
Such institutions are for instance the European Commission of Human Rights (art. 19 ff. of the Convention); the European Court of Human Rights (art. 38 ff. of the Convention); the Economic and Social Council of the U.N. (art. 16 ff. of the Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights); the Human Rights Committee (art. 28 ff. of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (art. 8 ff. of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination).
Geoffrey Marshall, “Notes on the Rule of Equal Law,” in Nomos IX, Equality (New York 1965), p. 268 ff.
The author refers here to Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s dissenting opinion in Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), at 472. In this case the U.S. Supreme Court held invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment a provision of the Illinois Community Currency Exchanges Act (1943) which excepted the American Express Company from the requirement that any firm selling or issuing money orders in Illinois must secure a licence and submit to State regulation. The Act intended to protect the public against the risks resulting from inadequate capital and insufficient safeguards of many small banking facilities; the excepted Company was regarded as of “unquestioned solvency and high financial standing.”
Op.cit., p. 109–110.
Concluded in 1952. Text in U.N.T.S., Vol. 193, p. 135 ff. Compare also article 3 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: “The States Parties to the present Covenant under take to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Convention.” See also below, § 40.
See Parvez Hassan, “The Word “Arbitrary” as used in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights: “Illegal” or “Unjust”?” in Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 10 (1969), p. 225 ff.
Compare on the following also the similar view taken by a Committee of Experts on Human Rights, laid down in its Report of 12 may, 1969, to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (Doc. CM(69) 59) on “Problems arising from the coexistence of the UN Covenants on Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights,” at p. 12.
See also Brecht, Op.cit., p. 409 ff.
Ernst E. Hirsch distinguishes between two types of discrimination, viz. discrimination on an emotional basis, related to a personal conflict and resulting from social prejudice, and intentional, rational discrimination, used as a weapon in a social conflict situation and aimed at exploitation and oppression (S.v. “Diskriminierung” in Wörterbuch der Soziologie, ed. by W. Bernsdorf, 2nd. ed., Stuttgart 1969, p. 191).
See also M. Rehbinder, “Die Diskriminierung: ihre Ursache und ihre Bekämpfung,” in Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Vol. 15 (1963), P-6 ff.
This is said without the implication that values which are developed and recognized in the international community are for that very reason morally superior to values of a smaller — national — community, as seems automatically to be assumed sometimes. See against this assumption W. Wengler, Völkerrecht, Vol. I, p. 98–99.
This conclusion can also be drawn from the discussion in the UN Commission on Human Rights concerning a proposal submitted by the delegate of the Ukrainian S.S.R. to delete the adjective “arbitrary” from the expression “arbitrary discrimination” in the draft of what was to become article 7 of the Universal Declaration. After a lengthy discussion this proposal was adopted. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 52, p. 8–13.
Compare for the earlier period for example article 4 and article 20 of the Statute on the International Régime of Railways (Geneva, 1923): “… to refrain from all discrimination of an unfair nature,..”; French version: “… toute discrimination qui aurait un caractère de malveillance…” (Text in Hudson, International Legislation, Vol. II, p. 1139 ff.). Similarly the interesting article 4 of the Convention on the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions (Geneva, 1927): “The following classes of prohibitions and restrictions are not prohibited by the present Convention, on condition, however, that they are not applied in such a manner as to constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination between foreign countries…” etc. The French version says: “discrimination arbitraire.” Text in Hudson, Vol. III, p. 2164.
See above, p. 44.
Supreme Court of Palestine, May 1928. Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases 1927–1928, Case no. 35 (p. 55–56).
Compare the examples, taken from the case law of the German Constitutional Court, given by H. F. Zacher, “Soziale Gleichheit,” in Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, Vol. 93 (1968), P-347–348.
This term is also used by Schindler Op.cit. p. 142 ff. (“indirekte Diskriminierung”). Sometimes the distinction is made between the law “on the books” and the law “as applied,” like in the Peace-treaties concluded in 1947 with Hungary (article 2) and Rumania (article 3), quoted by Schindler (p. 143): “… the law in force… shall not, either in their content or in their application discriminate or entail discrimination…” (italics added). We avoid the use of this terminology here because “the law as applied” could be confused with discrimination by the administrative and judicial branches of government.
Compare e.g. Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), in which the Supreme Court upheld a North Carolina law which prescribed a literacy test.
In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) the Court declared Virginia’s poll-tax inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. “The principle that denies the State the right to dilute a citizen’s vote on account of his economic status or other such factors by analogy bars a system wich excludes those unable to pay a fee to vote or who fail to pay.” The tax was US $ 1.50, but “The degree of discrimi nation is irrelevant.” In the joint dissenting opinion of Justices Harlan and Stewart we come across a remarkable passage which is worth quoting in this context:… “Arguments have been and can still be made in favor of (property qualifications for voters). For example, it is certainly a rational argument that payment of some minimal poll-tax promotes civil responsibility, weeding out those who do not case enough about public affairs to pay $ 1.50 or thereabouts a year for the exercise of the franchise. It is also arguable, indeed it was probably accepted as sound political theory by a large percentage of Americans through most of our history, that people with some property have a deeper stake in community affairs, and are consequently more responsible, more educated, more knowledgeable, more worthy of confidence, than those without means, and that the community and Nation would be better managed if the franchise were restricted to such citizens.”
Series B, No. 6 (10 September, 1923), p. 24.
Series A/B No. 44 (February 4th, 1932), p. 28.
Versailles, June 28th, 1919. Text in Hudson, International Legislation, Vol. I, p. 283 ff.
Compare the examples, taken mostly from the practice of the League of Nations, especially of the Comité Economique, given by Jaenicke, op.cit., p. 102–117.
Italian Government v. EEC Commission. Case no. 13/63, Common Market Law Reports 1963, p. 289 ff, at p. 311–312. This case concerned a complaint lodged by Italy against a decision of the Commission authorizing France under article 226 of the EEC treaty to impose a special tax on the import from Italy of refrigerators and accessories for refrigerators which caused “serious difficulties” in that sector of the French economy. Italy asserted that the tax should also apply to imports of like goods from the other member-States.
Völkerrecht, Vol. II, p. 1028, nt. 5.
Compare for an identic opinion Peter Pernthaler, Der Schutz der ethnischen Gemeinschaf ten durch individuelle Rechte (Wien und Stuttgart, 1964), who observes: “Diskriminationsverbote, welche… eigentlich die Grundlage des individual-rechtlichen Minderheiten-Schutz systems bilden, gebieten rechtliche und faktische Gleichbehandlung von Mehrheits- und Minderheitsangehörigen” (p. 33). He refers to the same view set forth by Verdross in “Der Grundsatz der rechtlichen und tatsächlichen Gleichstellung der Volkstämme auf Grund der Kollektivverträge über den Minderheitenschutz” (in Juristische Blätter, 1936). Also Verdross regarded the prohibition of discrimination as the basic rule (“Grundnorm”) of the minorities’ protection.
Very clear on this also Shigeru Oda in his discussion of the international protection of human rights in M. Sorensen, ed., Manual of Public International Law (London, New York 1968): “In fact, the treatment of minorities has now been replaced by the wider concepts of elimination of racial discrimination or apartheid and even of protection of human rights for all people without distinction as to race, sex, language, religion and so on” (p. 497).
Thus also Jaenicke, “Gleichbehandlung,” in Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts, Vol. I, p. 690 ff, at 692–693.
See below, § 58 and § 60, especially p. 157 ff.
In the Study of Discrimination in Education (E/CN.4/Sub. 2/181/Rev. 1, 1957, Charles D. Ammoun, Special Rapporteur), a distinction is made between “discriminatory practices resulting from a policy evidently intended to originate, maintain or aggravate such practices” and “discriminatory practices which are economic, social, political or historic in character.” (P. 4).
See for instance H. Schambeck, op.cit., p. 79 ff; Manuchehr Ganji, International protection of Human Rights (Geneva-Paris 1962), p. 204;
Georges Burdeau, Les Libertés publics (3ième ed., Paris 1966), p. 343;
Th. Tomandl, Der Einbau sozialer Grundrechte in das Positive Recht (Tübingen 1967), p. 6. As far as authors writing in German are concerned, references in support of this view are sometimes made to the theory of the four “status,” developed by Georg Jellinek in his “System der Subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte” mentioned above in § 16. Compare e.g. Schambeck, Op.cit., p. 25–27, and Tomandl, op.cit., p. 9–10. Also H. von Man-goldt and F. Klein, Das Bonner Grundgesetz (2nd. ed., Berlin and Frankfurt a.M. 1957), Vol. I, p. 58–60. In the discussion on article 3 of the Constitution, reproduced below in § 37, these authors remark that the right of the individual to “respect for equality” is a right belonging to the “negative status” (p. 195). These four “status” that together constitute the whole legal relationship between the individual and the State are distinguished by Jellinek in the following way: first of all there is the “status subiectionis,” also called the “passive status,” in which the individual performs services for the State. Then follows the “status libertatis” or the “negative status,” in which the individual enjoys freedom from the State; it constitutes what Jellinek designates as “eine staatsfreie, das Imperium verneinende Sphäre.” Next comes the “status civitatis,” also called the “positive status,” in which the individual can claim that the State performs services for him. Finally comes the “active status” (“Status der aktiven Zivität”), in which the individual exercises political rights and functions, and is entitled to share in or bear state authority (Op.cit., p. 86–87). The sharp distinction that is made between civil and social rights may in part have been caused by Jellinek’s explicit distinctions between these status. Though the division between them was not intended as a historic but rather as a systematic one, they reflect to some extent the historical development of the position of the individual in the Western European state. The authors we mentioned interpret the transition from the “laisser-faire” State to the “social” State for the position of the individual as a transition from the “status libertatis,” the “negative status” to the “status civitatis,” the “positive status.” As to the equality principle, the classic right to formal legal equality is transformed into a social right to material equality. Tomandl notes this development in particular with respect to the equality principle: “Es sind also vor allem die Freiheitsrechte die den Negativen Status konstituieren. Bei näherem Zusehen erweist sich dagegen das zum klassischen Grundrechtsbestand zählende Gleichheitsrecht als über diesen status libertatis hinausragend und zumindest tendentiell in den positieven Status verweisend… Solange die Gleichheitsverletzung nur negatorischer Wirkung begegnet, zur blossen Kassation des gleichheitswidrigen Aktes führt, wird die in den positiven Status zielende Richtung der Gleichheitsverbürgung freilich nicht sichtbar; sobald sich aber Tendenzen zeigen, und diese können wir heute deutlich wahrnehmen, den Gleichheitsanspruch nicht nur zur Beseitigung gleichheitsverletzende Regelungen, sondern auch zur Rechtsgrundlage ausgleichender Massnahmen und Regelungen zu verwenden, ist das Gleichheitsrecht bereits im status civitatis angesiedelt und schlägt die Brücke zu den sozialen Grundrechte.” (Op.cit., p. 9–10). The author refers to several decisions of the German Constitutional Court in support of this view. See also H. F. Zacher, Op.cit.
See P. Schneider, “Social Rights and the Concept of Human Rights,” in D. P. Raphael, ed., Political Theory and the Rights of Man (London 1967), p. 81 ff. Schneider states that the connection between “the classical and the modern doctrines of human rights” is not to be “interpreted in the sense of an antinomy but in the sense of a gradual differentiation” (p. 84; italics in original).
See for a similar view also J. van der Hoeven, De plaats van de Grondwet in het constitutionele Recht (Zwolle 1958), p. 198.
Schneider, Op.cit., p. 89.
See generally C. W. Jenks, The International Protection of Freedom of Association for Trade Union Purposes (Receuil des Cours, Vol. 87, 1955, I, p. 7 ff) and on the ILO Conventions in this field, p. 19–31.
Article 26 Universal Declaration; Article 13 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In article 13 is said, among other things, that “education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality” and that it “shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Similarly article 26 (2) of the Universal Declaration.
Schneider, Op.cit., p. 89. (Italics in original).
Paragraph 6 of that Study.
Paragraph 9 ibidem.
See below, § 60.
John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT. A Legal Analysis of the GATT (Indianapolis etc., 1969), p. 264.
§ 126.
Text in U.N.T.S., Vol. 362, p. 31 ff.
Text in U.N.T.S., Vol. 429, p. 9 ff.
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Vierdag, E.W. (1973). Discrimination. In: The Concept of Discrimination in International Law. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2430-3_4
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