Abstract
It is possible to approach the philosophy, sociology, and social psychology of George H. Mead in at least two major ways, depending on whether his thought is considered to be a systematic unity in which all central themes mesh internally and consistently, or whether Mead’s work is comprehended as a series of significant efforts to explore the nature of social reality from separate though genetically related perspectives which reveal serious internal deviations and tensions. Choice of approach is not an arbitrary matter: both modes of investigating Mead’s ideas necessarily have their limitations; but it is our conviction that the profound and original themes Mead explored in his intellectual life-time can best be grasped by choosing to follow the development in his thought that led him, in our view, from “social behaviorism” to a position which transcends behaviorism of any sort. The validity and value of our selected mode of procedure can, of course, be demonstrated only through an extended presentation. The exposition of the decisive and variant aspects of Mead’s thought through a developmental analysis is the necessary preparation for the critical evaluation of his thought.
“Man is rooted in society and his instincts are addressed to it.” —George Santayana
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Notes
“Mind, Self, and Society”-The First Phase
MSS, p. 1.
Ibid.
lbid.
MSS, p. 132.
MSS, p. 133.
lbid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
MSS, footnote pp. 13–14.
MSS, p. 14; see also Ibid., pp. 42-43, 63.
MSS, p. 46.
MSS, p. 47.
MSS, footnote p. 81.
MSS, p. 67.
Ibid.
MSS, p. 14.
MSS, p. 73; Cf. George H. Mead, What Social Objects Must Psychology Presupposer Journal of Phibsophy, Vol. VII, 1910, p. 178ff.
MSS, p. 97.
Ibid.
MSS, p. 77.
MSS, p. 78.
Ibid.
MSS, p. 80.
MSS, p. 81.
MSS, p. 10.
Ibid.
Ibid.
MSS, p. 30.
Ibid.
MSS, p. 332.
MSS, p. 329.
MSS, p. 136.
Ibid.
MSS, p. 137 and footnote on p. 137.
Although Mead develops extended analyses of problems involved in “role-taking,” he does not offer much toward the understanding of “role-taking” as such; the term remains undefined, though it is clear that to take the role of another is to put oneself in the place of another individual: see MSS, footnote, p. 141.
MSS, p. 150.
MSS, p. 151.
Ibid.
MSS, p. 152.
Ibid.
MSS, p. 154.
MSS, p. 155; Cf. Mead’s “A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XIX, 1922, pp. 161-62; also his “The Mechanism of Social Consciousness,” Ibid., Vol. IX, 1912, p. 402 ff.
MSS, footnote p. 155.
MSS, p. 156.
MSS, p. 173.
MSS, p. 197; Cf. “The Mechanism of Social Consciousness,” op. cit., p. 405 ff.; also Mead’s “The Social Self,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. X, 1913, p. 375.
MSS, p. 178.
MSS, p. 174.
MSS, p. 178.
MSS, p. 199.
MSS, p. 182.
Cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, L’Etre et le néant, Paris: Gallimard, 1943, pp. 561–638; also Sartre’s Anti-Semite and Jew (tr. by George J. Becker) New York: Schocken Books, 1948, pp. 59-60; see Maurice Natanson, A Critique of Jean-Paul Sartre’s Ontology, University of Nebraska Studies, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1951, p. 49 ff., p. 57 ff.
W. I. Thomas and Dorothy Swaine Thomas, The Chad in America, N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1938, p. 572: “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences”; Cf. W. I. Thomas, The Unadjusted Girl, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1923, pp. 41-44 and Social Behavior and Personality: Contributions of W. I. Thomas to Theory and Social Research,(edited by Edmund H. Volkart), N.Y.: Social Science Research Council, 1951, p. 81.
This concept is taken from Alfred Schütz. See his “Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Sept., 1953, p. 6 and also “Choosing Among Projects of Action,” Ibid., Vol. XII, No. 2, Dec. 1951, pp. 168-69.
MSS, p. 201.
“The Genesis of the Self and Social Control,” International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XXXV, 1924–25, pp. 263–64 (quoted in MSS, footnote, p. 7).
MSS, p. 18.
“The Philosophy of the Act”-The Second Phase
MSS, p. 7
PA, p. 364.
PA, p. 65.
PA, p. 147.
PA, p. 3.
Ibid.
Ibid.
PA, pp. 4–5.
PA, p. 5.
Ibid.
PA, p. 7.
Ibid.
Ibid.
PA, p. 6.
PA, p. 7.
Ibid.
PA, p. 8.
PA, p. 3.
PA, p. 8.
PA, p. 9.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
PA, pp. 9–10.
PA, p. 10.
We have taken the concept and terminology of “world taken for granted” from Alfred Schütz; see his “Choosing Among Projects of Action,” op. cit., p. 166 ff.
PA, p. 11.
PA, p. 12.
Ibid.
PA, pp. 12–13.
PA, p. 13.
PA, p. 14.
Ibid.
Ibid.
PA, p. 16.
PA, p. 18.
Ibid.
PA, p. 20.
Ibid.
Ibid.
PA, p. 227.
PA, p. 121; cf. “The Mechanism of Social Consciousness,” op. cit., p. 401.
PA, p. 128.
PA, p. 122.
Ibid.
PA, p. 151.
PA, p. 19.
PA, p. 22.
Ibid.
PA, p. 197.
PA, p. 196.
PA, p. 141.
PA, p. 142.
Ibid.
PA, p. 136.
Ibid.
PA, p. 24.
PA, p. 25.
PA, p. 23; see also Ibid., pp. 451-52.
PA, pp. 454–55.
MSS, p. 185.
MSS, p. 184.
PA, p. 30.
PA, p. 29.
PA, p. 30.
PA, p. 45.
PA, p. 104.
PA, p. 103.
PA, p. 108.
Ibid.
PA, p. 109.
PA, p. 110.
Ibid.
PA, p. 428.
PA, p. 429.
PA, p. 431.
PA, p. 212.
PA, p. 213.
PA, p. 152.
Ibid.
PA, pp. 160–64.
PA, pp. 159–60.
PA, pp. 160–61.
PA, p. 161.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
PA, p. 162.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
PA, p. 163.
PA, p. 343.
PA, pp. 343–44.
PA, p. 344.
PA, p. 345.
Ibid.
PA, p. 347.
Ibid.
Ibid.
PA, p. 348.
Ibid.
PA, p. 635.
PA, p. 178.
PA, p. 178.
Ibid.
PA, p. 179.
The term “perspectives” in this context refers to Whitehead’s terminology rather than to “standpoints” in role-taldng discussed previously in regard to Mind, Self, and Society.
PA, p. 199.
Ibid.
PA, p. 112.
PA, pp. 99–100.
PA, p. 114.
PA, p. 115.
Ibid.
PA, p. 182.
PA, pp. 118–19.
PA, p. 119.
Ibid.
Ibid.
PA, p. 115.
PA, p. 243.
PA, p. 115.
PA, p. 284.
PA, pp. 284–88.
“The Philosophy of the Present”-The Third Phase
PP, p. 1.
PP, p. 1; Cf. PA, pp. 355-56 and PP, pp. 19-20.
PP, p. 1.
Ibid.
“The Nature of the Past,” in Essays in Honor of John Detvey, New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1929, p. 238.
Ibid.; Cf. MT, pp. 292-325, 496 ff.
PP, p. 21.
PP, p. 2.
The Nature of the Past, op. cit., p. 240; Cf. Harold N. Lee, “The Hypothetical Nature of Historical Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LI, No. 7, April 1, 1954, pp. 213–220; Bruce Waters, “The Past and the Historical Past,” Ibid., Vol. LII, No. 10, May 12, 1955, pp. 253-269; Michael Oakeshott, Experience and Us Modes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933.
PP, p. 12.
PP, p. 26.
PP, p. 33.
PP, pp. 17–18.
The Nature of the Past, op. cit., p. 238.
PP, p. 30.
PP, p. 31.
PP, p. 1: “The present of course implies a past and a future, and to these both we deny existence.”
“The Philosophies of Royce, James, and Dewey in their American Setting,” in John Dewey: The Man and his Philosophy, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930, p. 79.
PA, p. 216.
PA, p. 353.
PA, p. 413.
PP, p. 14.
PP, p. 1.
PP, p. 11.
Ibid.
PA, pp. 413–14; Cf. PA, pp. 87-88.
PA, p. 21.
The concept of “relevance” as a part of the “biographical situation” of the individual is taken from Alfred Schütz; see his Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt, Vienna: Julius Springer, 1932, pp. 284–85 and also “Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action,” op. cit., pp. 5-6 and passim.
PP, pp. 24–25.
PP, p. 25.
PP, p. 11.
Ibid.
Ibid.
PP, pp. 11–12.
PP, p. 15.
PP, p. 64.
PP, p. 69.
PP, p. 67.
PP, p. 162.
PP, p. 163; Cf. William Hammerschmidt, Whttehead’s Theory of Time, New York: Kings Crown Press, 1947.
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Natanson, M. (1973). The Development of Mead’s Thought. In: The Social Dynamics of George H. Mead. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2408-2_2
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