Abstract
If we restrict ourselves to the pure phenomenology of cognition, then we will be concerned with the essence of cognition as revealed in direct “seeing,” i.e., with a demonstration of it which is carried out by way of “seeing” in the sphere of phenomenological reduction and self-givenness, and with an analytical distinction between the various sorts of phenomena which are embraced by the very broad term “cognition.” Then the question is as to what is essentially contained and grounded in them, from what factors they are built up, what possibilities of combination can be found while remaining purely within their essential natures, and what general interrelations flow from their essences.
[Extension of the sphere of investigation through a consideration of intentionality. The self-givenness of the universal; the philosophical method of the analysis of essence. Critique of the interpretation of evidence as feelings; evidence as self-givenness. No limitation on the sphere of genuine (Reell) immanence; the theme of all self-givenness.]
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© 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Husserl, E. (1990). Lecture IV. In: The Idea of Phenomenology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2371-9_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2371-9_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-247-0114-8
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-2371-9
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