The Objects of Acceptance: Competing Scientific Explanations
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Important revisions and additions to the contemporary objectives of acceptance rules result from construing a theory of warranted inductive inference to presuppose an account of adequate scientific explanations. We conceive the objects of acceptance rules to be the best of competing scientific explanations. Our primary interest is to show how to construct an analysis of competing explanations. Hence our specific investigation concerns the interrelations between the criteria of adequacy for scientific explanations and the definitions of the modes of competition between explanations.
KeywordsScientific Explanation Inductive Inference Inductive Logic Membership Condition Explanation Relation
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