# Bressan and Suppes on Modality

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## Abstract

Professors Bressan and Suppes have both argued that modality is of great importance to the philosophy of science. I shall not dispute this, but I shall raise some problems of interpretation, which arise if one considers the possibility of a philosophical retrenchment with respect to the use of modal concepts.

## Keywords

Silent Period Mathematical Entity Modal Concept Primitive Concept Philosophical Magazine
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## Notes

- 1.P. Suppes,
*Introduction to Logic*, Van Nostrand, Princeton, 1957, p. 298.Google Scholar - 2.For references and discussion, see M. Jammer,
*Concepts of Mass*, Harper, New York, 1964, pp. 92–95; Pendse’s papers are in the*Philosophical Magazine***24**(1937);**27**(1939); and**29**(1940).Google Scholar - 3.H. Simon, ‘Discussion: The Axioms of Classical Mechanics’,
*Philosophy of Science***21**(1954) 340–343; ‘Definable Terms and Primitives in Axiom Systems’, in*The Axiomatic Method*(ed. by L. Henkin*et al*.>), North-Holland, Amsterdam 1954, pp. 443–453; ‘A Note on Almost-Everywhere Definability’ (abstract),*Journal of Symbolic Logic***31**(1966) 705–706.CrossRefGoogle Scholar - 4.R. Stalnaker, ‘A Theory of Conditionals’, in
*Studies in Logical Theory*(ed. by N. Rescher), Oxford 1968, pp. 98–112;Google Scholar - 4a.R. Stalnaker and R. H. Thomason, ‘A Semantic Analysis of Conditional Logic’,
*Theoria***36**(1970) 23–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar - 5.For references and discussion, see my
*Introduction to the Philosophy of Time and Space*, Random House, New York, 1970 (henceforth*IPTS)*, Chapter VI, Sections 2 and 3.Google Scholar - 6.A. Grünbaum, ‘Why I Am Afraid of Absolute Space’,
*Australasian Journal of Philosophy***49**(1971) 96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar - 7.For one line of thought, see
*IPTS*, pp. 97–107 and 195–198; for another, my ‘Meaning Relations, Possible Objects, and Possible Worlds’ (with K. Lambert) in*Philosophical Problems in Logic*(ed. by K. Lambert), Reidel, Dordrecht 1970, pp. 1–19.Google Scholar - 8.See my ‘Theories and Counterfactuals’ forthcoming in a Festschrift in honour of Wilfrid Sellars (ed. by H.-N. Castañeda) and R. H. Thomason, ‘A Fitch-Style Formulation of Conditional Logic’,
*Logique et Analyse***13**(1970) 397–412; last paragraph.Google Scholar - 9.G. W. Mackey,
*The Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics*, W. A. Benjamin, New York 1963, pp. 1–4. A similar point could be made with reference to H. Simon’s first approach in his ‘The Axioms of Newtonian Mechanics’,*Philosophical Magazine***38**(1947) 888–905, and ‘The Axioms of Classical Mechanics’ (see note 3).Google Scholar

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© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland 1974