Abstract
If there is one set of arguments worse than those put forward for ‘value-free science’, it is those put forward against it. Both sets have one common characteristic, besides a high frequency of invalidity, and that is the failure to make any serious effort at a plausible analysis of the concept of ‘value judgment’, one that will apply to some of the difficult cases, and not just to one paradigm. Although the problem of definition is in this case extremely difficult, one can attain quite useful results even from a first step. The analysis proposed here, which goes somewhat beyond that first step, is still some distance from being satisfactory. Nevertheless, we must begin with such an attempt since any other way to start would be laying foundations on sand. And we’ll use plenty of prescientific examples, too, to avoid any difficulties with irrelevant technicalities. As we develop the definitions and distinctions, we’ll begin putting them to work, so that we will almost complete the argument while seeming to be just straightening out the concepts. For this is really an area where the problem is a conceptual one, rather than an empirical or inferential one.
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1974 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Scriven, M. (1974). The Exact Role of Value Judgments in Science. In: Schaffner, K.F., Cohen, R.S. (eds) PSA 1972. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 20. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2140-1_15
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2140-1_15
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0409-2
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-2140-1
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive