Abstract
The aim of this note is to criticize the view that it is never rational to attempt the impossible; it is not, however, the aim of this note to advocate all impossible aims. The ideal of positivism, which positivists deem obviously attainable, namely the unity of science in rationality and the rational unity of mankind, is here viewed as very worthwhile, but quite possibly impossible and certainly not obviously possible. Yet, to repeat, not all impossible aims or unattainable goals are reasonable to pursue.
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© 1974 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland
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Agassi, J. (1974). On Pursuing the Unattainable. In: Seeger, R.J., Cohen, R.S. (eds) Philosophical Foundations of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 11. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2126-5_25
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2126-5_25
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0376-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-2126-5
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