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The Process and the System

  • Nathan Rotenstreich
Chapter
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Abstract

Our analysis so far leads us to the conclusion that for Hegel there is a twofold beginning which eventually amounts to one, a one endowed with an internal rhythm: the beginning lies in a concept which is “immediate,” in the simple relation of the concept to itself. Yet once there is such a relation, the concept cannot rest where it is. It has to move beyond itself to achieve its fulfilment. The beginning is the point of departure endowed with the propensity towards its self-transformation.

Keywords

Contemporary World Greek Philosophy Philosophical System Open Universe True Infinity 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

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Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands 1974

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nathan Rotenstreich

There are no affiliations available

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