Abstract
What is apparent to one who reads the Berkeleian corpus including the Siris, is how close to Newton’s is Berkeley’s conception of science. By his own account Berkeley, in his view of scientific explanation as deduction of the event (or law) from more encompassing laws, is indebted to Newtons’ discussion of method in the Principia. The “hypothetico-deductive” method embodies what is meant by scientic explanation: deriving general rules from the “phenomena” and in a reverse procedure predicting new phenomenal consequences from these laws, allowing a continual process of confirmation. With respect to events that have occurred, to explain or “demonstrate” the “phenomenon,” consists in showing that its occurrence is a logical consequence of the accepted laws.
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© 1973 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Brook, R.J. (1973). Conclusion. In: Berkeley’s Philosophy of Science. International Archives of the History of Ideas / Archives Internationales D’Histoire Des Idees, vol 65. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1994-1_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1994-1_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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