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On Representing ‘True-in-L’ in L

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Language in Focus: Foundations, Methods and Systems

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 43))

Abstract

Given Tarski’s familiar treatment of the semantic paradoxes, no formal language can adequately represent its own truth-concept.1 But natural languages do, apparently, express their own truth-concepts and this fact alone has been enough to motivate some to seek alternative treatments of the paradoxes. In this paper we demonstrate that a language construed according to the ‘category’ approach,2 modified in certain respects, can indeed express its own truth-concept.

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Bibliography

  • Fine, K.: 1974, ‘Vagueness, Truth and Logic’, unpublished manuscript.

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  • Kleene, S. C. 1950, Introduction to Metamathematics, Van Nostrand, New York.

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  • Martin, R. L. 1967, ‘Toward a Solution to the Liar Paradox’, The Philosophical Review 76, 279–311.

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  • Martin, R. L., 1968, ‘On Grelling’s Paradox’, The Philosophical Review 77, 321–331.

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  • Martin, R. L., 1970, ‘A Category Solution to the Liar’, in R. L. Martin (ed.), The Paradox of the Liar, Yale Univ. Press. London and New Haven, pp. 91–112.

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  • Martin, R. L., 1974, ‘Sortal Ranges for Complex Predicates’, The Journal of Philosophical Logic 3, 159–167.

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  • Tarski, Alfred, 1956, ‘The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages’, in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, Oxford Univ. Press, pp. 152–278.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Livingston College, Rutgers University, USA

    Robert L. Martin

  2. University of California, Irvine, USA

    Peter W. Woodruff

Authors
  1. Robert L. Martin
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  2. Peter W. Woodruff
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Tel-Aviv University, Israel

    Asa Kasher

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© 1976 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland

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Martin, R.L., Woodruff, P.W. (1976). On Representing ‘True-in-L’ in L. In: Kasher, A. (eds) Language in Focus: Foundations, Methods and Systems. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 43. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1876-0_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1876-0_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0645-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-1876-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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