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Duhem, Quine and A New Empiricism

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Can Theories be Refuted?

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 81))

Abstract

As in the case of great books in all branches of philosophy, Pierre Duhem’s La Théorie Physique, first published in 1906, can be looked to as the progenitor of many different and even conflicting currents in subsequent philosophy of science. On a superficial reading, it seems to be an expression of what later came to be called deductivist and instrumentalist analyses of scientific theory. Duhem’s very definition of physical theory, put forward early in the book, is the quintessence of instrumentalism:

A physical theory is not an explanation. It is a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of principles, which aim to represent as simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible a set of experimental laws [p. 19].

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© 1976 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

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Hesse, M. (1976). Duhem, Quine and A New Empiricism. In: Harding, S.G. (eds) Can Theories be Refuted?. Synthese Library, vol 81. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1863-0_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1863-0_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0630-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-1863-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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