Abstract
In trying to decide whether teleology in the sciences is good, bad, or indifferent, philosophers have tended to focus on three sorts of cases. They are exemplified in these paradigms:
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(1)
The function of the heart is to pump blood. (Call this a functional ascription)
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(2)
The goal of the rat is to reach food at the end of the maze. (Goal-ascription)
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(3)
Jones intends to retire early by working hard. (Intentionascription)
These sorts of cases are sometimes confounded, but they should be clearly distinguished. In a rough-and-ready fashion, some important differences and connections can be described in the following way.
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Bibliography
Beckner, Morton, The Biological Way of Thought, New York, 1957.
Hempel, Carl G., The Logic of Functional Analysis’, in Symposium on Sociological Theory, Evanston, Ill., 1959.
Lehman, Hugh, ‘Functional Explanations in Biology’, Philosophy of Science 32 (1965).
Nagel, Ernest, The Structure of Science, New York, 1961.
Scheffier, Israel, Thoughts on Teleology’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (1959).
Sommerhoff, George, Analytical Biology, London, 1950.
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© 1976 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Beckner, M. (1976). Function and Teleology. In: Topics in the Philosophy of Biology. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 27. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1829-6_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1829-6_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0596-9
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