Abstract
According to Professor von Wright, a sharp methodological division exists between the science of natural phenomena and the study of human action. Natural phenomena are explained, and predicted, on the causal model: to explain a natural event is to specify its cause, and such an explanation is thought to yield predictions for similar events. One modern form of this causal approach, according to von Wright, is the so-called deductive-nomological model of explanation: to explain an event is to subsume it under a law. Human actions, on the other hand, are held to be subject to a wholly different methodology of investigation. Von Wright argues, vigorously and often persuasively, that the correct model of understanding actions is not the causal-nomic model, but rather the following fundamental schema of practical inference:1
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A intends to bring about p.
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A considers that he cannot bring about p unless he does a.
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Therefore, A sets himself to do a.
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Notes
G. H. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1971), p. 96. Hereafter we will refer to this work by citing page numbers in the body of the text.
See, e.g., Roderick M. Chisholm, ‘Freedom and Action’, in Keith Lehrer (ed.), Freedom and Determinism (Random House, New York, 1966).
See Donald Davidson, ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, Journal of Philosophy 60(1963), 685-700.
I am assuming here that the relation of entailment or implication can be explained in an adequate way for events, actions, and the like — or, at least, that such talk is an oblique way of talking about their descriptions.
For a somewhat more detailed discussion of counterfactuals and determinative relationships, see my ‘Noncausal Connections’, Nous 8 (1974), 41-52. Also see David Lewis, ‘Causation’, Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973), 217-36.
See Lewis, ibid.
For example, see Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. III, ch. 3, and of course Kant, who says, “Whoever wills the end wills also (so far as reason decides his conduct) the means in his power which are indispensably necessary thereto. This proposition is, as regards the volition, analytic…,” Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, sec. 2 (tr. by Thomas K. Abbott).
Alvin I. Goldman, A Theory of Human Action (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970), p. 102.
For a more detailed discussion of cases like this, see Jack W. Meiland, The Nature of Intentions (Methuen, London, 1970), ch. 1.
This was Professor von Wright’s reply in a conversation with me.
Glanville L. Williams, The Mental Element in Crime (Hebrew University Press, Jerusalem, 1965), p. 51.
For a useful discussion of conditional intentions, see Meiland, op. cit., ch. 2.
For possible notions of ‘action plan’, see G. E. Miller, E. Galanter, and K. Pribram, Plans and the Structure of Behavior (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York, 1960), and Goldman, op. cit., esp. pp. 56-62.
Cf. Miller, Galanter and Pribram, op. cit., p. 61
What does it mean when an ordinary man has an ordinary intention? It means that he has begun the execution of a Plan and that this intended action is a part of it. ‘I intend to see Jones when I get there’ means that I am already committed to the execution of a Plan for traveling and that a part of this Plan involves seeing Jones.
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© 1976 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland
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Kim, J. (1976). Intention and Practical Inference. In: Manninen, J., Tuomela, R. (eds) Essays on Explanation and Understanding. Synthese Library, vol 72. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1823-4_13
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