Intention and Practical Inference

Abstract

According to Professor von Wright, a sharp methodological division exists between the science of natural phenomena and the study of human action. Natural phenomena are explained, and predicted, on the causal model: to explain a natural event is to specify its cause, and such an explanation is thought to yield predictions for similar events. One modern form of this causal approach, according to von Wright, is the so-called deductive-nomological model of explanation: to explain an event is to subsume it under a law. Human actions, on the other hand, are held to be subject to a wholly different methodology of investigation. Von Wright argues, vigorously and often persuasively, that the correct model of understanding actions is not the causal-nomic model, but rather the following fundamental schema of practical inference:¹

• A intends to bring about p.

• A considers that he cannot bring about p unless he does a.

• Therefore, A sets himself to do a.