Abstract
In the discussion between the analytical philosophy of science and dialectics there has recently been a remarkable change. At the same time as the latest debate about method was staged in German sociology on inverted positions, with essentially ideological arguments and culminating in the misleading confrontation of a double positivism,1 a change of argumentation was made within analytical philosophy, largely hidden from the participants of the so-called positivism debate. It is focused on the analytical philosophy of action, or, more precisely: the interest in the concept of action and in the logic of practical argumentation has been growing in the analytical philosophy of science as a result of the realization that the foundations of social and historical sciences were so far insufficiently clarified. The change originated thus in the analytical philosophy of history. The debate upon the methodical basis of the historical sciences2 dissolved the traditional positivistic frame of mind in analytical philosophy and put into motion the well worn fronts in the discussion of the philosophy of science. Analytical philosophy of history — as has been shown by the long controversy about the suggestion from Hempel/Op- penheim for a comprehensive theory of explanation (Covering Law- Model)3 — is only possible under restriction of the analytical program.
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Notes
Cf. the controversy between H. Albert and J. Habermas in: Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie, Neuwied/Berlin, 1969, pp. 139-305 (the reproach of positivism reproach p. 237, 208 footnote 27, 216, 281 among others). — The author wishes to thank Mr. Robert Pettit and Mr. John Insley, B.A., for their help in translating the essay into English.
Cf. the synopsis by P. Gardiner (ed.), Theories of History, Part two: Recent Views concerning Historical Knowledge and Explanation, New York, 1959, pp. 344-515. Starting point is the well known essay from C. G. Hempel, ‘The Function of General Laws in History’ (1942).
Cf. the sequel to the essay (1942) from C. G. Hempel/Oppenheim, ‘The Logic of Explanation’ (1948), is reprinted by H. Feigl/M. Brodbeck (eds.) in Readings in the Philosophy of Science, New York, 1953. The designation ‘Covering Law Model’ stems from W. Dray. The covering law model was first formulated by Karl R. Popper, Logik der Forschung, Vienna, 1935 and The Open Society and Its Enemies, London, 1945, Vol.II,p.248f.
G. H. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, London, 1971, p. 11. Hereafter this is cited as EU.
P. Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation, Oxford, 1952, p. 91f.
Ibid., p. 60.
Cf. ibid., p. 103f. That Gardiner — in opposition to Hempel’s intention — interpreted the subsumption theory of explanation causally is apparently connected with the fact that his criticism was predominantly influenced by Popper’s formulation, which permits such an interpretation.
W. Dray, Laws and Explanation in History, Oxford, 1957, p. 104.
Ibid., p. 119.
G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention, Oxford, 1957, and Ch. Taylor, The Explanation of Behavior, London, 1964. — A good synopsis of the discussion since then is contained in A. White (ed.), Philosophy of Action, Oxford, 1968. Also compare the investigations of R. Bernstein, Praxis and Action, 1972, and A. Danto, Analytical Philosophy of Action, Cambridge, 1974.
EU, p. 23.
Cf. the historical synopsis in EU, ‘Two Traditions’ (I), especially paragraphs 1-4 and 10.
Ibid., p.96.
Ibid., p. 97.
Ibid., p.27.
EU, p. 180, footnote 75. The reference to affinities between Aristotle and Hegel came from Juha Manninen.
G. W. F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, Vol. 2 Section 2, Chapter 3 (in the English text and in the translation incorrectly given) from the Leipzig edition 1951, part 2, p. 394. Hereafter this is cited as Logik.
Cf. EU, p. 200, footnote 4.
Logik, Vol. 1, Book 2, Section 3, Chapter 4, p. 193.
Ibid.
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, translated by H. J. Paton, New York, 1964, p. 127. I am referring here in part to a comment J. Blühdorn made in a discussion about my paper ‘Positivismuskritik und Historismus. Über den Ursprung des Gegensatzes von Erklären und Verstehen im 19. Jahrhundert’ (1971). Compare J. Blühdorn and J. Ritter (eds.), Positivismus im 19. Jahrhundert. Beiträge zu seiner geschichtlichen und systematischen Bedeutung. Frankfurt/Main 1971, p. 102f.
The conclusive evidence concerning Kant’s terminology is summarized in the Critique of Judgement, translated by J. C. Meredith, Oxford, 1969, Part. 2, §78. Also compare the Introduction V (Explanation=comprehension) as well as Part 2, § 61 and 64.
Ibid., § 78.
Ibid., § 78.
Ibid., §78.
Logik, Vol. 2, Section 3, p. 407. Compare with it the corresponding usage of understanding in Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie, published by J. Hoffmeister, Hamburg 1959, p. 30f.
Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, published by J. Hoffmeister, Hamburg 1955, p. 33.
Cf. Logik, Vol. 2, Book 2, Section 3, Chapter 3, p. 194.
Ibid., The criticism refers to the historical causal explanation in the mechanical-materialistic philosophy of history during the 18th century. Cf. D’Holbach, Système de la nature, London, 1773,1. III, p. 163; Voltaire, Essai sur les moeurs, Paris, 1756, Chapter LIV.
Cf. Helvétius, Del’Vesprit, Paris, 1758, III 1.
Logik, p. 194.
Cf. EU, IV, 2-3, p.142ff.
Ibid., p. 142.
Ibid., pp. 140,144,146.
G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, published by G. Lasson, Vol. 4, Leipzig, 1923, p. 920.
Ibid., p. 926.
Ibid., p. 926. With the reference to the religious tradition Hegel explained, as is well known, why the idea of freedom became revolutionary in France alone. Protestant Germany already had with the Reformation the revolution within itself. Also compare p. 922ff.
Evidence for this is Hegel’s explanation of the rise of the cities and their consequence for the feudal social system. Compare the corresponding section in Vorlesungen zur Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, Vol. 4, p. 842ff, 855, 858.
Ibid., p. 855.
Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, p. 86.
Cf. the draft of a teleological doctrine of principles, ibid., pp. 28-148, especially p. 93f.
Ibid.,Vol.2, Section 2, Chapter 3, p. 389.
G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopaedie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1817), AIII: Die Lehre vom Begriff, § 153, Werke, Vol. 6, published by H. Glockner, Stuttgart, 1959, p. 123. In the second edition Hegel weakened his emphatic consensus with Kant’s teleology (§ 204, Werke, Vol. 8, p. 413). Also compare with this the criticism in ‘Glauben und Wissen’ (1801), Werke Vol. 1, p. 315f.
Critique of Judgement, Introduction, IV.
Ibid.
Logik, Vol. 2, Section 2, Chapter 3, p. 390.
Ibid.
Cf. the chapter on Aristotle in Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophic Werke, Vol. 18, p. 341ff., 346f., 349.
Enzyklopaedie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, §58, Werke, Vol. 8, p. 156f. 50 Cf. Werke, Vol. 18, p. 342 with Werke, Vol. 18, p. 158.
Logik, Book 2, Section 2, Chapter 3, p. 390.
Ibid.
Cf. the explanation of the concept ‘Objektivität’ in Logik. Book 2, Section 2, p. 358f.
Ibid., p. 397f., Enzyklopaedie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, §208-209, Werke, Vol.8,p.419f.
Cf. the footnote of this equation above in Section I according to von Wright, p. 10.
Cf. Logik, Book 2, Section 3, Chapter 2, pp. 478-483.
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Riedel, M. (1976). Causal and Historical Explanation. In: Manninen, J., Tuomela, R. (eds) Essays on Explanation and Understanding. Synthese Library, vol 72. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1823-4_1
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