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When Should we Ignore Evidence in Favour of a Hypothesis?

  • Joseph Agassi
Chapter
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Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 28)

Abstract

There is a supposition behind the title question: when should we ignore evidence in favour of a hypothesis? The supposition is, sometimes we may do so, sometimes we may not. Some philosophers have explicitly rejected this supposition, others have implicitly rejected it. Let me outline the brief history of this point.

Keywords

Existential Statement Universal Statement Modus Tollens Scientific Research Programme Observation Report 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1975

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  • Joseph Agassi

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