• Joseph Agassi
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 28)


Sensationalism is the traditionally important doctrine according to which all our knowledge of the world comes to us through the senses. The chief aim of these pages is to systematize the traditional arguments against sensationalism, to show their incompleteness, and to supplement them with some modern arguments. Round the turn of the century a new version of sensationalism was proposed by Duhem and Meyerson. It is not surprising that only modern criticism meets their version, since they constructed it after they had accepted the traditional arguments against the traditional versions of sensationalism. It will be easily seen that theirs is the last possible version, so that criticizing it may be considered as criticising sensationalism altogether.


Theoretieal Knowledge Theoretical Knowledge Sensational Element Sense Experience Privileged Access 
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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1975

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  • Joseph Agassi

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