Criteria for Plausible Arguments

  • Joseph Agassi
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 28)


The most conspicuous datum in philosophy, perhaps the most important one as well, is the following:(d) Most philosophers consider the thesis of scepticism1 highly implausible, yet they consider the traditional arguments in its defence highly plausible at first glance. The rationale for the qualifier ‘at first glance’ in the datum is the following generally accepted thesis concerning plausibility, (p) A thesis defensible by plausible arguments is plausible, and vice versa. Most philosophers woudl accept our plausibility thesis (p) as a matter of course, if not as analytic. Hence, our datum (d) without the qualifier ‘ at first glance’ would allow us to charge most philosophers with inconsistency. (c) Most philosophers are inconsistent in viewing sceptism as both implausible and plausible. The charge is answered, of course, by the qualifier which will force us or midfy (c) by qualifying ‘plausible’ in it with ‘seeming’, and this qualifying ‘inconsistent’ likewise.


Inductive Logic Rational Ethic Plausible Argument Historieal Relativism Inductive Support 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1975

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joseph Agassi

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations