Abstract
It is a commonplace of the history of science that the rise of modern science involved the breaking off of the specific disciplines of modern science from theology and from philosophy in general.1 This is supposed by some to have occurred mainly in the seventeenth century and later and by others to have had its origins in the Middle Ages or earlier. Sociologists of science have suggested various external social or cultural factors that might have allowed or supported such specialization. In his classical study of seventeenth century England, Robert Merton pointed to religious, economic, and technological factors.2 In a more recent study extending to the medieval origins of specialization, Joseph Ben-David suggests that the medieval university guilds acted as a buffer between the practical goals of public service set by outside society for university graduates and the individual professor who might be inclined to pursue his special interests in conjunction with colleagues.3
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Notes
Robert K. Merton, Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970). Originally published in Osiris 4, Part I I (1938).
Joseph Ben-David, The Scientist’s Role in Society. A Comparative Study ( Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1971 ), pp. 46 - 55.
Cf. Fernand Van Steenberghen, The Philosophical Movement of the Thirteenth Century (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1955), p. 112:… the rationalist historians have long denied that the philosophy of the Middle Ages had arrived at this scientific autonomy; they maintained that during this long period there was only a philosophical-religious syncretism, a speculation dominated by dogmas and watched by ecclesiastical authority.
Anneliese Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe der Spätscholastischen Naturphiloso¬phie ( Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1955 ), pp. 3 - 4.
Cf. Paul Wilpert, ‘Boethius von Dacien - Die Autonomie des Philosophen’, Beiträge zum Berufsbewusstsein des Mittelalterlichen Menschen, Miscellanea mediaevalia, vol. 3 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1964), pp. 136–7, referring to a 1272 Univer¬sity of Paris statute on this topic.
Cf. Pope Gregory IX’s admonitions to the faculty of the University of Paris in 1231. Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages. (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955), p. 246, 250. The statutes of the University of Paris of 1366-1389 also say that Sentence Commentaries should not include discussions of logic or philosophy unless absolutely necessary. (P. Glorieux, ‘Sentences’, Dictionnaire de théologie catho¬lique, tome 14, part 2, col. 1876). For theologians’ limitations of themselves from treating philosophical questions, see Daniel A. Callus, ‘The Function of the Philosopher in thirteenth-century Oxford’, Beiträge zum Berufsbewusstsein des Mittelalterlichen Menschen, Miscellanea Mediaevalia, Vol. 3 ( Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1964 ), pp. 156–158.
Cf. James A. Weisheipl, ‘Ockham and Some Mertonians’, Mediaeval Studies 30 (1968), 197.
Cf. Robert W. Schmidt, S. J., The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 25–26. Aquinas says, for instance, (Expositio super librium Boethij De Trinitate, 6,1, sol. 2 ad 3): In addiscendo incipimus ab eo quod est magis facile, nisi necessitas aliud requirat. Quandoque enim necessarium est in addiscendo non incipere ab eo quod est facilius, sed ab eo a cuius cognitione sequentium cognitio dependet. Et hac ratione oportet in addiscendo a logica incipere…quia aliae scientiae ab ipsa dependent. Aquinas also says (In II. Met., 5, n 335): Et propter hoc debet prius addiscere logicam quam alias scientias, quia logica tradit communem modum procedendi in omnibus aliis scientiis.
Cf. M.-D. Chenu, La Théologie au douzième siècle (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957 ), especially Chapter 4, ‘Grammaire et théologie’, originally published in Archives d’histoire doctri-nale et littéraire du moyen âge, 20 (1935–36), pp. 5–28, and Chapter 15, “Les Magistri. La ‘science’ théologique.” Also by Chenu, La Théologie comme science au XlIIe. siècle, 3rd. edit. ( Paris: J. Vrin, 1957 ).
Chenu, La Théologie comme science, pp. 15–16.
Cf. Chenu, La Théologie au douzième siècle, p. 353.
Chenu, La Théologie comme science, pp. 11,67-92.
Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 372-375. Cf. also Wilpert, “Boethius von Dacien,” (note 7) for Boethius of Dacia’s treatment of the relations of theology and philosophy particularly as applied to the question of the eternity of the world.
Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy, p. 331ff, 366. Van Steenberghen, The Philosophical Movement of the Thirteenth Century, pp. 63–64,68ff.
Cf. Van Steenberghen, The Philosophical Movement of the Thirteenth Century, pp.
Cf. Van Steenbergen, The Philosophical Movement of the Thirteenth Century, pp.
Chenu, La Théologie comme science, p. 89. My discussion of the relations of theology and philosophy for St. Thomas is based mainly on this study by Chenu.
It is worth noting that in this relationship of subalternating and subalternate sciences, it is the superior science which is a tool in the inferior science and not the reverse.
Cf. A. C. Crombie, Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science 1100-1700 ( Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1953 ), pp. 91–96.
For Ockham’s views of the relations of philosophy and theology in general, see Robert Guelluy, Philosophie et théologie chez Guillaume d’Ockham ( Louvain: Nauwe- laerts, 1947 ).
Cf. Philotheus Boehner, ed., Ockham. Philosophical Writings (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1957), pp. xliii-xlvi.
Cf. Heiko Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology. Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism ( Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963 ), pp. 30–56.
Cf. Anneliese Maier, Ausgehendes Mittelalter, Vol. 2 (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1967), pp. 373–376. Philotheus Boehner, ‘The Notitia intuitiva of Non- Existents According to William Ockham’, reprinted in Boehner’s Collected Articles on Ockham, Eligius Buytaert (ed.), (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1958 ), pp. 268–300.
Cf. Ockham, Super Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, Book IV, Q. 7 S in Opera Plurima (Lyon, 1494–96, reprinted Gregg Press Ltd., 1962 ).
Cf. Maier, Ausgehendes Mittelalter, Vol. 2, pp. 376–391. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy, pp. 505-511.
Heiko Oberman, ‘Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism with Attention to its Relationship to the Renaissance’, Harvard Theological Review, 53 (1960), 47–76.
Quodlibeta Septem (Strasbourg, 1491, Réimpression en fac-similé, Louvain: Editions de la Bibliothèque S J., 1962 ), Quodl. IV, Q. 35.
Cf. Aquinas, Sentence Commentary, Book IV, Dist. 12 (in Opera Omnia, Parma: Petrus Fiaccadorus, 1852–1873, Photolithographice Reimpressa, New York: Musurgia, 1948), Vol. 7, p. 654:… divina dispositio quae aliquid ordinat secundum legem communem, etiam sibi aliqua reservat praeter legem communem facienda ad aliquod Privi¬legium gratiae communicandum; nec ex hoc sequitur aliqua inordinatio, quia divina dispositio unicuique rei ordinem imponit. Also Summa Theologiae, Ilia, Q. 77, art. 1 (Blackfriars, 1965), Vol. LVIII, p. 128:… dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse ordinatum secundum communem legem naturae, cuius tamen contrarium est ordinatum secundum speciale Privilegium gratiae….
Cf. Anneliese Maier. Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert, 2nd edit., ( Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1966 ), pp. 29–41.
Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe, pp. 159-175.
Cf. A. Pelzer, ‘Les 51 articles de Guillaume Occam censures, en Avignon, en 1326’, Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique, 28 (1922), 261 (art. 21): Récitât opinionem dicentem quod substantia et quantitas sunt eadem res nec tarnen reprobat, immo secundum ea Respondet in diversis locis ad argumenta et in ea in uno loco residet. Magistri: Dicimus quod ponere quantitatem non esse rem distinctam a substantia est contra communem sententiam sanctorum, doctorum et philosophorum, quam reputamus veram. Quo supposito dicimus esse erroneum et periculosum et contra determinationem ecclesie, que ponit in sacramento altaris solam substantiam converti, quantitate et ceteris acci- dentis remanentibus.
Quodl. 4, Q. 21; Sent. IV, Q. 5 II, ad tertium. Cf. Sent. IV
Sent. IV, Q. 6 F: Ideo dico quod duplex est mutatio, una acquisitiva alia deperditiva. Aquisitiva est in corpore Christi quia accipit esse ubi prius non habuit esse. Sed deper-ditiva est ipsius substantie panis que non manet et prius mansit. Ockham here follows Duns Scotus’s view of transubstantiation. The Thomist and Scotist interpretations of transubstantiation are both considered orthodox. Cf. S.T., p. 66, fn. e. See also Gabriel N. Buescher, O.F.M., The Eucharistie Teaching of William of Ockham (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America, 1950 ).
H. Denifle and A. Chatelain (eds.), Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis (Paris: 1889-1897), vol. 1, p. 551: Quod Deus non potest facere accidens sine subiecto nec plures dimensiones simul esse.
For Aegidius Romanus, see Anneliese Maier, Die Vorläufer Galileis, pp. 28-41. Walter Burley’s treatment of this aspect of the physics of the Eucharist occurs in his Tractatus Primus. Cf. Anneliese Maier, Ausgehendes Mittelalter, vol. 1, pp. 219-226, and Edith Sylla, The Oxford Calculators and the Mathematics of Motion, 1320–1350, Unpublished Dissertation, Harvard University, 1971.
Cf. Guelluy, Philosophie et Théologie, pp. 14–21.
For the “double truth” see Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, pp. 58–66. Also Wilpert, “Boethius von Dacien,” p. 149ff.; Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe, pp. 3–44.
James B. Conant, Modern Science and Modern Man (Garden City, N.Y.: Double- day and Company, Anchor Books, 1953), pp. 166–178: As to the unifying, materialistic World Hypothesis
Cf. L. Baudry, ed., Le Tractatus de Principiis Theologiae attribué a G. d’Occam (Études de Philosophie Mediévale, 13, Paris: J. Vrin, 1936), p. 125: Pluralitas nunquam ponenda est sine necessitate ponendi. Exponit autem quid vocat necessitatem ponendi et dicit quod est ratio vel experientia vel auctoritas scripture, cui contradicere non licet, et auctoritas ecclesie. Hoc autem rationabile principium est quia sine istis liceret res ad placitum multiplicare.
Cf. Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe, pp. 159–160,166, fn. 34, 167.
Ockham-Birch, De Sacramento Altaris, p. 336: Ista sunt subtiliter dicta, nullus tamen amator veritatis debet offendi si causa veritatis inquirendae et exercitii impug- nentur. Si enim vera sunt, expedit audire obiectiones ut solvantur ut sic Veritas clarius innotescat. Si falsas sunt, expedit ut convincantur. See also pp. 158–160,196, 210, 240.
Ibid., pp. 276,360,370,378,436,440.
Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe, pp. 3–44.
Cf., e.g., Stanley Jaki’s introductory essay in Pierre Duhem, To Save the Phenomena. An Essay on the Idea of Physical Theory from Plato to Galileo (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969 ), pp. xix-xxii. Also Pierre Duhem, ‘Physics of a Believer’, published as an appendix to Duhem’s, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory ( New York: Atheneum, 1962 ).
Originally, La ThéoriePhysique: Son Objet, Sa Structure, 2nd edit., ( Paris: Marcel Riviere, 1914 ).
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Sylla, E.D. (1975). Autonomous and Handmaiden Science: St. Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham on the Physics of the Eucharist. In: Murdoch, J.E., Sylla, E.D. (eds) The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 26. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1781-7_10
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